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Designing and Enforcing Preliminary
Agreements
Albert H. Choi and George Triantis*
Preliminary agreements—variously labeled as memoranda of
understanding, letters of intent, term sheets, commitment letters, or agreements
in principle—are common in complex business transactions. They document an
incomplete set of terms that the parties have agreed upon, while anticipating
further negotiation of the remaining provisions. They often create legal
obligations, particularly a duty to negotiate in good faith. This duty has been the
subject of a substantial number of judicial opinions over the past few decades
and yet continues to be regarded as a confusing and unpredictable issue in
contract law. Legal scholarship is hamstrung in its analysis of the case law
because it has focused on only one purpose for this good faith duty: protecting
the parties’ reliance investments in the bargaining process. This Article
broadens the analysis by introducing multiple goals that parties may seek in
imposing legal obligations on their negotiation process and by shifting the focus
to what the courts have identified as a necessary feature of the duty to negotiate
in good faith: the expectation of some fidelity to the agreed-upon terms specified
in the preliminary agreement. The ease with which the parties may deviate from
these terms in their negotiations is the essence of the good faith standard. Once
parties have searched for and chosen their respective contracting partner, they
need the incentives and flexibility to tailor and optimize the terms of their deal
while also efficiently constraining value-claiming behavior and allocating
exogenous risks. The recognition of such broader objectives (beyond protection
of reliance investments) allows us also to justify how and why courts are willing
to enforce the obligation with the more robust remedy of expectation damages
instead of the reliance damages that are advocated by prior scholarship. We
show that, by choosing whether to agree to a duty to negotiate (in good faith or
otherwise) and by selecting the appropriate damages measure, the parties can
achieve the desired level of “stickiness” while addressing concerns about the
uncertainty of a flexible legal standard such as good faith.
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Introduction
Contract formation in commercial transactions can be an expensive and
intricate process involving multiple stages and players, as well as significant
investments in expertise and information. In complex asset purchases,
intellectual-property licenses, leases, corporate acquisitions, or venturefinancing transactions, to name just a few types, it is practically impossible
for the parties to execute a fully stipulated and binding contract in a single
meeting or over a very short period of time.1 Negotiations of these
transactions are typically sequenced, with a subset of issues being addressed
at each stage by numerous agents with different expertise. Midstream in their
negotiations, the parties frequently enter into preliminary agreements,2 often
labeled memoranda of understanding, agreements in principle, commitment
letters, letters of intent, or term sheets. These agreements document the
parties’ agreement-to-date on some or all of the core provisions for the
underlying transaction, but they also contemplate, and to some extent
regulate, the parties’ remaining negotiation. Preliminary agreements should
therefore be thought of as setting ground rules for negotiations, which may
include obligations of confidentiality, disclosure, and exclusivity.
1. In an asset sale or corporate acquisition, for instance, it is customary for the parties to conduct
often extensive due diligence while they are negotiating over the sale agreement. As the due
diligence investigation uncovers more information, the new information can affect the nature and
character of the terms, such as representations and warranties, covenants, conditions, termination,
and indemnification.
2. Although we follow convention by using the label “preliminary agreement,” this is
sometimes a misnomer because the parties may reach such an agreement after a significant amount
of negotiation. As we discuss later, business terms are often settled after the legal terms (e.g., master
services agreements) and at other times before (e.g., loan term sheets). See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.
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Significantly, these agreements can also create either express or implied legal
duties to negotiate in good faith. The invocation of the good faith (or similar)
standard invites the court to police the parties’ negotiations, especially if they
break down.
Over the past few decades, a significant volume of litigation has arisen
over the enforcement of duties to negotiate in good faith. Although contract
law polices bargaining activity that leads to concluded contracts (such as
through the doctrines of misrepresentation, coercion, duress,
unconscionability, and unjust enrichment), U.S. law does not have a general
duty to bargain in good faith that courts would enforce if negotiations break
down before an enforceable agreement has been reached.3 Nevertheless,
parties have the ability to invoke such a duty in a preliminary agreement, and
the duty to negotiate in good faith in U.S. law is rooted in the parties’ intent.
Courts are called on to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to
legally binding good faith obligations, what is required by their good faith
standard, and the remedy for breach. Despite many judicial opinions
addressing these questions, the law in this area has not been satisfactorily
explained or rationalized. In particular, the existing legal scholarship has
been hamstrung in its ability to explain the law of preliminary agreements
because of its focus on one purpose: encouraging relationship- or dealspecific investment in the contemplated transaction, including due diligence
investigation into whether the transaction is profitable and expenditures in
contract design that increase its profitability. The current scholarly
explanation is that the enforcement of a good faith obligation protects such
investment from opportunistic holdup by the noninvesting party in
subsequent stages of negotiation.
Although this rationale appears in some judicial opinions, it seems to be
only a small part of the explanation of the existence and enforcement of
obligations to bargain in good faith. Parties opt into a standard such as good
faith because it can address a variety of other actions and goals. Had the
protection of reliance investment been the sole objective, more
straightforward methods could protect reliance expenditures: for example, a
simple promise to reimburse reasonable expenses if negotiations fall
through.4 We also observe that the courts’ reluctance to award expectation
3. To be sure, noncontract doctrines in tort (e.g., fraud or misrepresentation) and unjust
enrichment may be available in some cases of bargaining breakdown. The merits of a general
obligation to negotiate in good faith have been debated in legal scholarship. See, e.g., E. Allan
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 220 (1987) (explaining adverse effects of a general duty to
negotiate in good faith); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
673, 686–88, 690 (1969) (arguing in favor of a duty to bargain in order to protect reliance); Leon E.
Trakman & Kunal Sharma, The Binding Force of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith, 73
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 598, 599–600 (2014) (criticizing English courts’ reluctance to enforce agreements
to negotiate in good faith).
4. Good faith could contribute to a more refined protection than blanket reimbursement of each
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damages stems more prominently from concerns about proof than the nature
of the protected interest. Many courts have indicated their willingness to
compensate for lost expectancy if the plaintiff could establish the terms of
the contract that would have been entered into if the defendant had acted in
good faith. Moreover, the facts of many judicial cases reflect that parties
agree to negotiate in good faith even when anticipated investments after the
preliminary agreement are small relative to those that preceded it. The
presence of other goals is reflected in several fact patterns and features of the
case law and can be explained by analyzing the parties’ motivations to stage
their negotiations.
By focusing on the protection of reliance, legal scholarship leaves
unexplained a number of important features of preliminary agreements in
practice and in the courts. This Article introduces and describes a more robust
and complete framework of the motivation for preliminary agreements and
the duty to negotiate in good faith. We suggest that these agreements are tools
for regulating the negotiation process when parties, following search and
diligence activity, are reasonably confident that they have found the partner
with whom they wish to deal. In these circumstances, they seek to regulate
their negotiations in one or more of the following respects beyond the
protection of reliance investments.5 In addition to encouraging value-creating
reliance investment, the parties wish to discourage attempts or investments
by either side to improve its bargaining position and thereby claim a larger
share of the transaction surplus. It is noteworthy in this respect that express
promises to negotiate in good faith or with best efforts are often seen in
agreements complementing more explicit exclusivity promises not to shop an
offer or negotiate with any other prospective party for a specified duration of
time.6
While shifts in the distribution of the transaction surplus may result from
the deliberate investments of the parties in improving their alternative

party’s reliance, similar to the combination of negligence and contributory negligence in tort law,
because the defendant would be required to compensate only if negotiations broke down because of
her lack of good faith.
5. As discussed in section II(C)(2), one category of surplus-increasing investment is in the
design of the remaining deal terms, typically by lawyers, such as representations and warranties,
termination rights, remedies, etc. In addition to the conventional holdup problem, this type of
investment raises a different obstacle by giving the investing party beneficial private information.
The investing party could use its acquired information to extract a larger share of the surplus—for
example, by offering a warranty at a higher price. Anticipating this asymmetry, the uninformed
party will be skeptical of all offers from the informed party (even surplus-increasing ones), and this
in turn discourages the informed party from making the investment in the first place. In a companion
paper, we analyze the problem of asymmetric information and surplus-producing investment in
depth using game-theoretic analysis. Albert Choi & George Triantis, Relationship-Specific
Investment, Asymmetric Information, and the Role of Good Faith Obligations (Va. Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 2019-02, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3330973
[https://perma.cc/N9RA-8YCH].
6. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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options, they may also be caused by exogenous changes in markets and
surrounding conditions. The preliminary agreement therefore also provides
the means by which the parties can efficiently allocate selected risks of
changed circumstances that would affect the distribution of surplus from the
deal. Although time may be needed to complete the terms of the contract, it
may be valuable for the parties to allocate some risks sooner. A relevant
example is a preliminary agreement in a loan commitment that pegs the
interest rate against changes in the market rate, while the parties negotiate
other terms, such as representations, warranties, and covenants. Indeed, the
enforcement of preliminary agreements in a series of leading cases in the
Second Circuit was motivated by the allocation of interest-rate risk and not
the protection of reliance investments.7 As we explain in this Article, the
parties may seek in their preliminary agreement to protect the risk allocation
while allowing the parties to create value by continuing their contract
negotiations.
The aforementioned goals of promoting efficient specific investment,
discouraging value-claiming activity, and efficiently sharing exogenous risks
must be balanced against the flexibility needed to reach an optimal agreement
on the remaining terms or to respond to previously unforeseen contingencies.
This is, of course, an instance of the existential tension in contracts between
commitment and flexibility. In this regard, the preliminary agreement is a
mechanism by which the parties can fine-tune this balance by giving weight
to their agreed-upon terms. We argue that a negotiation duty based on a
contextual contract standard—whether good faith or best efforts—can be
well suited to address this multifaceted regulation of the negotiation process
that parties often wish to invoke. The parties (or the court) would be
correspondingly unlikely to invoke such a commitment in a preliminary
agreement when reliance, risk allocation, and danger of rent extraction are
minimal or absent.8 Once we recognize the beneficial role that a contextual
standard can play under the right circumstances, we can justify the court’s
enforcement of such an open-ended promise with a stronger remedial
measure than reliance damages, including the award of expectation damages.
Drawing from prior work in which we explain how parties can exploit the
benefits of standards and avoid the potential costs of litigation and judicial
error, we respond to the concerns of lawyers and scholars about the litigation
of vague standards.9

7. See infra subsection II(C)(4)(a).
8. The parties are also unlikely to agree to negotiate in good faith if they perceive the court to
be very unreliable or deem default remedies, such as expectation or even reliance damages, to be
inefficiently large. See infra text accompanying notes 186–95.
9. E.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly
Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008) [hereinafter Choi & Triantis, Costly Verification];
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate
Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) [hereinafter Choi & Triantis, Strategic Vagueness].
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This Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the
relevant common law and judicial policy and highlights the neglected
relationship of the good faith duty with the other provisions in the preliminary
agreement. In this respect, we show that a central feature of the duty is a
requirement of fidelity to the terms settled in the preliminary agreement.
Part II provides guidelines for the parties’ design of multistage contracting
and their use of preliminary agreements to regulate the remainder of their
negotiation process by imposing some stickiness on their settled terms. In
particular, we describe the common scenario in which, after investing in a
search, the parties determine that they wish to transact with each other, invest
in the design of optimal transaction terms while deterring value-claiming
investments, and allocate certain risks that would affect the surplus division.
We tailor our discussion closely to the case law introduced in Part I,
particularly from courts in the Second Circuit. Subpart II(D) shows how
granting expectation damages for breaching the duty to negotiate in good
faith can be consistent with the existing contract law doctrines. Part III
describes the benefit of legal standards, such as good faith or best efforts, to
support the parties’ objectives in staged negotiations. The use of standards
that are costly to verify and susceptible to judicial error is often dismissed in
legal scholarship in favor of crisp and clear rules. We have rebutted this belief
in other work and draw on that work here to show how in some
circumstances, a legal standard may yield superior results to alternative
approaches, whether full enforcement, low-level sanctions, or
nonenforcement. We summarize our contribution in the conclusion and
provide suggestions for future inquiry.
I.

The Modern Law of Preliminary Agreements
The law of preliminary agreements can be summarized in three sets of
questions that courts face in enforcing them: (1) did the parties have a duty
to negotiate in good faith; (2) what behavior constitutes bad faith when
negotiations break down; and (3) what is the appropriate judicial remedy?
With respect to the first question, the modern law relating to preliminary
agreements in most U.S. jurisdictions is reflected in a taxonomy of three
types of incomplete agreements. The first type is a mere agreement to agree,
which reflects an insufficient meeting of the minds and creates no legally
enforceable obligation.10 In this type of agreement, the parties memorialize

10. See, e.g., Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 877, 880–81 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (distinguishing between an unenforceable “agreement to agree” and a written agreement
to negotiate in good faith); Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 94 P.3d 945, 948, 950 (Wash.
2004) (holding that an agreement to agree is not enforceable and that, in a contract to negotiate,
“[t]he parties did not exchange promises to conform to a specific course of conduct during
negotiations, such as negotiating in good faith, exclusively with each other, or for a specific period
of time”). Ridgway v. Wharton is a classic statement that an agreement to agree is not enforceable.
(1857) 10 Eng. Rep. 1287, 1297, 1314–15; VI H.L.C., 238, 263–64, 306–09.
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their mutual understanding but have either not reached the point of wishing
to invoke legal enforcement or not given the court sufficient basis on which
to regulate their negotiations.11 Even without legal consequence, however,
these agreements play important roles and may rely on forces other than legal
enforcement, such as moral, relational, or reputational sanctions.12 Under the
second type of incomplete agreements, the parties agree upon many, if not
most, of the material terms, intend to be bound by them, and anticipate no
significant future negotiation (or renegotiation) of terms. 13 This agreement
(sometimes called a Type I preliminary agreement) is “fully” enforceable as
a contract, unless the parties expressly intend otherwise.14 In enforcing, the
courts will fill any missing terms with legal default or commercially
reasonable terms (especially if the transaction is common and the terms are

11. See Keystone, 94 P.3d at 948 (quoting Sandeman v. Sayres, 314 P.2d 428, 429 (Wash.
1957)) (stating that an agreement to do something that requires a further meeting of the minds is not
enforceable).
12. See Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. REV. 376, 398–99 (2018) (suggesting that
formal enforcement may be unnecessary given various types of nonlegal sanctions).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), which provides:
“Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be
prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and
adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are
preliminary negotiations.”
14. See, e.g., Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 545 F.3d 114, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that the parties
had addressed relevant contingencies such as buyer financing and thus had a Type I agreement);
Arnold Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 587–88 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding
evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable agreement that would later be
formalized); V’Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1968) (drawing on the language of the
parties’ correspondence to find that they intended to create a binding agreement); Learning Annex
Holdings, LLC v. Whitney Educ. Grp., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining
that, even if a more formal agreement is not produced, each party may demand performance under
a Type I agreement); Cohen v. Lehman Bros. Bank, 273 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 548–49 (2d Cir. 1998))
(stating that the parties’ intention is “key” in determining whether they have entered into a Type I
agreement); Larwin-S. Cal., Inc. v. JGB Inv. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 52, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting
Burrow v. Timmsen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)) (noting that not every term
of an enforceable agreement must be present in a contract); Loppert v. Windsortech, Inc., 865 A.2d
1282, 1287, 1291 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that the communications between the parties established
an enforceable agreement because, in part, there was no evidence that they agreed to only be bound
by a formal document), aff’d sub nom. Windsortech, Inc. v. Loppert, 867 A.2d 903 (Del. 2005)
(unpublished table decision); Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, 346 A.2d 419, 423–24 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (stating that if the “basic essentials” of an agreement are “sufficiently
definite,” then the parties’ intention will not be frustrated by any remaining gaps in the contract). In
New York, the dichotomy between binding versus nonbinding preliminary agreements was laid out
by the Second Circuit in V’Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1968):
Two rules on this subject are well established: first, if the parties intend not to be bound
until they have executed a formal document embodying their agreement, they will not
be bound until then; and second, the mere fact that the parties contemplate
memorializing their agreement in a formal document does not prevent their informal
agreement from taking effect prior to that event.
Id. at 499.
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relatively standard)15 and award the usual contract law measure of
expectation damages. Conversely, if a court finds that the parties did not
intend to create any legally binding obligations, the court usually allows the
parties to walk away from the negotiations without any liability.
Historically, judges, scholars, and commercial parties were dissatisfied
with the binary choice between full enforcement of a contract and no
enforcement of an agreement to agree, and they sought a middle ground that
incorporates a negotiation standard such as good faith.16 At the same time,
American law has rejected a general duty to negotiate in good faith that exists
in some civil law jurisdictions.17 This was based on concerns that it would
chill negotiations, create uncertainty, and add undue pressure on parties to
conclude their negotiations.18 Under the law that emerged, U.S. courts
enforce obligations in preliminary agreements, including good faith in
negotiations, but only if those obligations can be found in the objective intent
of the parties to be bound, rather than being triggered simply by the start of

15. If there are open terms and the parties intended to be bound, the court can fill the gaps, even
significant ones like price. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)
(stating that the price is a “reasonable price at the time for delivery if . . . the price is left to be agreed
by the parties and they fail to agree”); id. §§ 2-308, 2-309 (filling gaps with respect to place and
time for delivery of goods).
16. For decades, contract scholars have been calling for middle ground exemplified by a good
faith standard. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 286 (articulating that there is not an adequate
reason for refusing to give the explicit intention of the parties to negotiate effect); Knapp, supra
note 3, at 716, 728 (arguing for recognition of a middle ground that would direct the attention of
courts to the good faith of the nonperforming party). The emergence of promissory estoppel offers
some softening of the sharp edge between a full contract and no contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing for enforcement of a promise that
would be reasonably anticipated to induce action or forbearance). But it is relatively rare in use
when bargaining has failed.
17. The duties of good faith and fair dealing in the Uniform Commercial Code and Restatement
(Second) of Contracts do not extend to precontract negotiations. The civil law duty to negotiate in
good faith is often referred to as culpa in contrahendo, and American courts have declined to adopt
it, leaving it to the parties to opt in if they choose. STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON,
CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 330–
31 (1995); see also Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[P]rime significance attaches to the intentions of the parties and to their
manifestations of intent.”). While the civil law jurisdictions (presumably) have an opt-out regime,
common law countries have the opt-in rule with respect to the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
In contrast, the common law duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of contracts
does apply when the parties attempt to modify an existing contract. See infra note 79.
18. Allan Farnsworth explained the policy behind the absence of wholesale regulation of
negotiation in the U.S. as follows:
The difficulty of determining a point in the negotiations at which the obligation of fair
dealing arises would create uncertainty. An obligation of fair dealing might have an
undesirable chilling effect, discouraging parties from entering into negotiations if
chances of success were slight. The obligation might also have an undesirable
accelerating effect, increasing the pressure on parties to bring negotiations to a final if
hasty conclusion.
Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 242–43.
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negotiations.19 In contrast to the fully enforceable contracts (Type I), these
are sometimes referred to as Type II agreements.20

19. Applying Illinois law, Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc., 248 A.2d 625 (Del.
1968), is perhaps the opinion that initiated the trend toward judicial enforcement of contracts to
negotiate. In that case, the letter of intent stated that the parties “shall make every reasonable effort
to agree upon and have prepared as quickly as possible a contract providing for the foregoing
purchase . . . embodying the above terms and such other terms and conditions as the parties shall
agree upon.” Id. at 627. A third party bid higher than the buyer and the seller terminated negotiations
even though the buyer agreed to all additional terms proposed by the seller, including price
adjustments and other concessions. Id. at 628. Since then, a very significant number of opinions
have enforced agreements to negotiate, many of which we refer to in the footnotes. E.g., Brown v.
Cara, 420 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New York law); Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data
Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Illinois law); Newharbor Partners, Inc. v. F.D.
Rich Co., 961 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying Rhode Island law); Channel Home Ctrs., Div. of
Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Pennsylvania law); Tribune
Co., 670 F. Supp. 491 (applying New York law); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (applying California law); SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene,
Inc., 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013) (applying Delaware law); Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co., 169 P.3d 1255
(Or. 2007) (applying Oregon law). Based on our survey of case law, it seems that fewer than a dozen
states have yet to enforce agreements to negotiate.
20. The Type II label originated in the Second Circuit. Judge Leval distinguished between
Type I and Type II preliminary agreements in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n of America v.
Tribune Co. With respect to Type I agreements, Judge Leval stated:
[A Type I agreement] occurs when the parties have reached complete agreement
(including the agreement to be bound) on all the issues perceived to require negotiation.
Such an agreement is preliminary only in form—only in the sense that the parties desire
a more elaborate formalization of the agreement. The second stage is not necessary; it
is merely considered desirable.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit reiterated this categorization
in later cases, including Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.
1989), and Adjustrite Systems, Inc. v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1998).
With respect to Type II agreements, Judge Leval stated:
The second and different sort of preliminary binding agreement is one that expresses
mutual commitment to a contract on agreed major terms, while recognizing the
existence of open terms that remain to be negotiated. Although the existence of open
terms generally suggests that binding agreement has not been reached, that is not
necessarily so. For the parties can bind themselves to a concededly incomplete
agreement in the sense that they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in
good faith in an effort to reach final agreement within the scope that has been settled
in the preliminary agreement.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498 (emphasis added). More recently, the Second Circuit court
described Type II agreements as follows:
“Type II” preliminary agreements . . . are “binding only to a certain degree,” reflecting
agreement “on certain major terms, but leav[ing] other terms open for further
negotiation.” Type II agreements “do[] not commit the parties to their ultimate
contractual objective but rather to the obligation to negotiate . . . in good faith in an
attempt to reach the . . . objective within the agreed framework.”
Brown, 420 F.3d at 153 (second, third, and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548) (applying New York law); cf. Frazier Indus., L.L.C. v. Gen. Fasteners
Co., 137 F. App’x 723, 734–35 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a preliminary agreement bound the
parties to negotiate in good faith but declining to find a breach of that duty); IDT Corp. v. Tyco
Grp., S.A.R.L., 918 N.E.2d 913, 915 n.2, 917 (N.Y. 2009) (criticizing the Type I versus Type II
distinction and finding a binding obligation to negotiate in good faith but not a breach of that
obligation).
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In fact, many commercial parties enter into preliminary agreements in
which they assent to a course of conduct during negotiations, often by
expressly invoking a standard such as good faith or best (or reasonable)
efforts, while settling on some of the core terms of their exchange. Explicit
promises to bargain up to express standards are common in many types of
transactions, including asset purchases, intellectual-property licenses, leases,
bank loans,21 venture-capital financing,22 and corporate mergers and
acquisitions.23 To be sure, not all preliminary agreements incorporate
promises to negotiate in good faith.24 In searching for the parties’ intent, most

21. See infra subpart II(C).
22. In venture capital financing, for instance, expressly opting into the duty to negotiate in good
faith is quite common. In the model forms published by the National Venture Capital Association,
the model term sheet expressly stipulates (as part of a no-shop clause) that “[t]he [financing
recipient] agrees to work in good faith expeditiously towards a closing.” NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL
ASS’N, TERM SHEET 14 (2019), https://www.mccarter.com/files/Uploads/Images/CICHandout
040412.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UT3-C6MX].
23. Practitioners identify several advantages from entering into a letter of intent in merger and
acquisition (M&A) transactions, including: (1) allowing the parties to “test the waters” before
incurring the costs of negotiating a definitive agreement and performing due diligence; (2) morally
or ethically obligating the parties to key terms; (3) dealing with complexity; (4) satisfying premerger
notification requirement under the Hart–Scott–Rodino (HSR) Act; and (5) securing necessary
financing. 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 91–92 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 2 ABA, MODEL STOCK
PURCHASE AGREEMENT]. First, as part of a “match right,” whenever a target corporation receives
an unsolicited offer from a third party, the clause obligates the target corporation to negotiate in
good faith with the purchaser so as to render the third party’s offer no longer attractive. Such match
rights are common in corporate-acquisition transactions. See, e.g., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC
COMPANY 169–71 (2011) [hereinafter ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT] (imposing the duty to
negotiate in good faith with the purchaser before the target board can change its recommendation
to its shareholders); Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69
STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1031–33 (2017) (documenting the rise and the prevalence of match rights in
acquisitions involving public target corporations). Second, as part of a dispute resolution mechanism
primarily over valuation, transacting parties will also agree to negotiate in good faith. For instance,
in purchase-price-adjustment mechanisms, which allow the transacting parties to adjust the purchase
price that the buyer has to pay the seller after closing (based on updated accounting statements), if
the parties were to proceed to dispute resolution, they will agree to negotiate in good faith. See 1
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
WITH COMMENTARY 67–68 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that the “parties shall negotiate in good faith in
order to seek agreement on the procedures to be followed by the Independent Accountants, including
procedures with regard to the presentation of evidence”). A similar duty is seen frequently in earnout agreements. 2 ABA, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra, at 135. Contracting parties
often expressly opt into the duty to negotiate in good faith in other preliminary agreements, such as
the letter of intent and memorandum of understanding.
24. Letters of intent in M&A transactions commonly include express stipulations as to which
provisions are binding (such as exclusivity, confidentiality, and expense reimbursement) and which
are not (such as purchase price and other deal terms). 2 ABA, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT, supra note 23, 97–106; see JamSports & Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336
F. Supp. 2d 824, 828–29 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (examining a letter of intent that expressly stipulates that
only the confidentiality, exclusivity, and publicity provisions are binding). In many cases, parties
will expressly disclaim any obligation to negotiate in good faith, to negotiate further, or to enter into
a definitive proposal. ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 342–43.
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courts are inclined to enforce clear and express language agreeing to or
disclaiming a duty of good faith.25 But, sometimes the language of the
parties’ preliminary agreement is ambiguous (or rendered ambiguous by
other indicators), and courts may look more broadly at relevant evidence,
including: (a) the parties’ intent as revealed in the language of the agreement;
(b) the context of the negotiations; (c) the existence of open terms or lack of
clarity, particularly essential, material, or major terms; (d) the conduct of the
parties, including partial performance; and (e) the customary use of
formalities in this type of transaction.26 Even if the language of the
preliminary agreement seems to exclude binding obligations, extrinsic
statements (including internal communications within one party’s
organization) or conduct may lead the fact finder to find that the parties in
fact intended to create a good faith duty. Given the highly fact-dependent
nature of the inquiry and the immaturity of the good faith doctrine in this
area, commentators have noted that the case law is characterized by
inconsistent results, and lawyers warn clients about the consequent traps for
the unwary in letters of intent and similar documents.27
25. According to Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Chancery Court:
Letters of intent mean something . . . . [P]arties enter into letters of intent for a reason.
They don’t enter into them because they are gossamer and can be disregarded
whenever situations change. They enter into them because they create rights.
. . . [I]f parties want to enter into nonbinding letters of intent, that’s fine. They can
readily do that by expressly saying that the letter of intent is nonbinding, that by
providing that, it will be subject in all respects to future documentation . . . .
Glob. Asset Capital, LLC v. Rubicon US REIT, Inc., No. 5071-VCL, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16,
2009) (order granting temporary restraining order); see, e.g., Newharbor Partners, Inc. v. F.D. Rich
Co., 961 F.2d 294, 299 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that the enforceability of an obligation to act in
good faith “turns on the clarity with which such intent is expressed in the instrument”); Emma
Robinson, Getting Out of a Bind: Making Sure Your Non-Binding Letter of Intent Is Actually NonBinding, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP: GLOBAL PRIV. EQUITY WATCH (Mar. 24, 2016), https://
privateequity.weil.com/getting-bind-making-sure-non-binding-letter-intent-actually-non-binding
[https://perma.cc/DG8D-M2TM] (advising that a letter of intent should include a “clear,
unambiguous statement” that the parties do not intend for it to be binding).
26. E.g., Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2005); Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v.
Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1989); Learning Annex Holdings, LLC v. Whitney Educ.
Grp., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 499–503 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This five-factor test in determining
whether the parties have entered into a Type II preliminary agreement is a modification from the
four-factor test previously used by Second Circuit courts, e.g., Winston v. Mediafare Entm’t Corp.,
777 F.2d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1985), to determine whether the parties have entered into a binding
preliminary agreement. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498–99. In applying the Type II test, courts
have held that the most important factor in determining whether an intermediate agreement is
binding is the language used by the parties in the document. See, e.g., Budget Mktg., Inc. v.
Centronics Corp., 927 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Iowa law to find that the parties did
not bind themselves to a duty to negotiate in good faith because the intention expressed in their
letter of intent was clear); R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984)
(placing “considerable weight” on a party’s explicit statements of intent).
27. See, e.g., Browning Jeffries, Preliminary Negotiations or Binding Obligations? A
Framework for Determining the Intent of the Parties, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2012) (noting
the inconsistent treatment by courts toward good faith claims); Gregory J. Marsden & George J.
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Although courts are no strangers to standards of good faith or best
efforts, commentators have noted that the content of this standard remains
difficult to specify and predict.28 The failure to conclude an agreement itself
is clearly not a sufficient indicator of bad faith, even if due to the defendant’s
self-interested and strategic bargaining.29 Good faith invokes an element of
motive and a requirement of “honesty in fact”30 that precludes deliberate,
material factual misrepresentations but does not require disclosure of private
information.31 While some courts have interpreted good faith as precluding
negotiations with competing bidders, other courts require exclusivity to be
explicitly specified in the preliminary agreement.32 In fact, agreements often
combine an express obligation to negotiate in good faith with covenants of
confidentiality and exclusivity.33
Siedel, The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith: Are BATNA Strategies Legal?, 14 BERKELEY BUS.
L.J. 127, 154–55 (2017) (highlighting the concern of unknowingly agreeing to a duty to negotiate
in good faith).
28. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 259–60 (“It would be difficult to find a less
predictable area of contract law.”); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1427 (2010)
(“[T]he courts’ experience so far provides little normative guidance concerning the breadth of the
enforceable obligation . . . .”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 675 (2007) (“This modern approach provides too
little normative guidance.”).
29. See, e.g., A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp.,
Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that a “duty to negotiate in good faith does not
encompass an automatic duty to approve the final deal”). Applying Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit
in Feldman v. Allegheny International, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988), stated: “So one cannot
characterize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in negotiations could be termed
dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other party. The proper recourse is to walk away from
the bargaining table, not to sue for ‘bad faith’ in negotiations.” Id. at 1223; see also Venture Assocs.
Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[s]elf-interest is not
bad faith” (citing Feldman, 850 F.2d at 1223)); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 964 F. Supp.
2d 299, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Venture Assocs., 96 F.3d at 279) (same); Jenkins v. Cty. of
Schuylkill, 658 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 158–59)
(same).
30. Honesty in fact is the core of the Uniform Commercial Code definition of good faith. U.C.C.
§ 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
31. Some courts have held that the good faith obligation does not of itself require the defendant
to disclose activity in competition to the negotiated transaction. SuperValu Inc. v. Associated
Grocers, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 985, 991 (D. Minn. 2006); Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 578
N.E.2d 789, 798–99 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 592 N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. 1992);
see also Trovare Capital Grp., LLC v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 646 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2011)
(holding that misrepresentation is a basis for finding breach of duty to negotiate in good faith under
a letter of intent, especially when part of a strategy to avoid a deal).
32. See, e.g., Venture Assocs., 96 F.3d at 277 (observing that good faith might entail an
obligation not to entertain other offers). But see Gas Nat., Inc. v. Iberdrola, S.A., 33 F. Supp. 3d
373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (defendant’s failure to disclose the existence of bidders other than the
plaintiff did not constitute bad faith, particularly because the parties contemplated and rejected
including an exclusivity clause); SuperValu, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (noting that the obligation to
negotiate in good faith does not preclude competition between the parties where their letter of intent
explicitly provides for it).
33. The National Venture Capital Association term sheet incorporates the duty to negotiate in
good faith as part of a no-solicitation (or no-shop) obligation. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N,
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Although negotiations might break down because one party simply
walks away, they more commonly fail as a result of one party’s unreasonable
(from the perspective of the other party) insistence on or rejection of
proposed terms. That party’s insistence or rejection might be motivated by
the goal of extracting a much better deal or simply avoiding an unprofitable
transaction. Given that the duty to negotiate in good faith is rooted in the
parties’ mutual intent, whether that party’s behavior is justified is
appropriately based on the parties’ expectations at the time of the preliminary
agreement.34 Notably, courts decline to enforce good faith obligations in the
absence of a framework or settled terms in the preliminary agreement.35 They
use the settled terms as a benchmark for determining whether proposals or
rejection of proposals are made in good faith. Insisting on terms that vary or
do not conform with terms settled in the preliminary agreement may be bad
faith.36 This is especially likely in the face of evidence that such insistence is
a pretext for scuttling the deal because of dissatisfaction with the settled
terms. Yet, as explained below, it would not be desirable for the duty to be
so invasive as to bar any deviation from the settled terms in all
circumstances.37
supra note 22, at 14–15.
34. In their treatise on contractual good faith, Steven Burton and Eric Andersen suggest that, in
the context of the duty to negotiate, good faith means that a party cannot reject a proposal with
respect to an open term pretextually because of dissatisfaction with or regret over a closed term
(including the emergence of a better offer or an adverse market change) and that a party may not
object to all objectively reasonable proposals for the open terms. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note
17, at 369–70, 379.
35. A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp., Inc., 873
F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The full extent of a party’s duty to negotiate in good faith can only
be determined . . . from the terms of the letter of intent itself.”); Clark Res., Inc. v. Verizon Bus.
Network Servs., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1119, 2011 WL 1627074, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2011)
(acknowledging “the danger of applying a duty of good faith, without some limiting principles, to
the process of complex commercial negotiations”); Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 282
P.3d 359, 368–69 (Alaska 2012) (granting summary judgment for the defendant after finding no
breach of duty to negotiate in good faith when the letter of intent did not include a framework for
negotiations against which any such obligation could be evaluated); 2004 McDonald Ave. Realty,
LLC v. 2004 McDonald Ave. Corp., 858 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (holding that
“[n]o objective criteria or standards against which the defendant’s efforts can be measured were
stated in the [letter of intent], and they may not be implied from the circumstances of this case”);
Jenkins v. Cty. of Schuylkill, 658 A.2d 380, 381–82, 385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting
Apothekernes, 873 F.2d at 158–59) (explaining that in the absence of agreed-upon terms, or even a
negotiating framework, the parties were free to insist on or reject any proposed terms to the
contract); see also BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 17, at 360 (observing that “[t]he better view
is that a general duty to negotiate, without more, is too indefinite to be enforced”).
36. Farnsworth divides Type II preliminary agreements into two subcategories: (1) agreements
with open terms and (2) agreements to negotiate. Agreements with open terms bind the parties with
respect to the settled terms (such as the interest rate in the Tribune Co. example) while obligating
the parties to negotiate in good faith the unsettled terms. Agreements to negotiate, on the other hand,
obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith all the terms of the deal. See Farnsworth, supra note 3,
at 250–51.
37. See, e.g., Karns v. Jalapeno Tree Holdings, L.L.C., 459 S.W.3d 683, 694 (Tex. App. 2015)
(noting that the duty of good faith did not prevent the parties from revising covenants in their letter
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The centrality of settled terms is prominent in many opinions. For
example, in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune
Co.,38 Judge Leval stated that “parties can bind themselves to a concededly
incomplete agreement in the sense that they accept a mutual commitment to
negotiate together in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement within
the scope that has been settled in the preliminary agreement.”39 Under this
agreement, a party may demand that its counterparty “negotiate the open
terms in good faith toward a final contract incorporating the agreed terms.”40
Judge Leval further stated that:
Each [party] was obligated to seek in good faith to conclude a final
agreement within the terms specified in the commitment letter,
supplemented by such representations, warranties and other
conditions as are customary in such transactions. Teachers would not
have been free to walk away from the loan by reason of a subsequent
decision that the transaction was not in Teachers’ interest.41
Similarly, in Adjustrite Systems, Inc. v. GAB Business Services, Inc.,42 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a party did not negotiate in good
faith when it “insisted on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary
writing.”43 More recently, in Brown v. Cara,44 the Second Circuit
described it as an “obligation to negotiate the open issues in good faith in
an attempt to reach the [contractual] objective within the agreed
framework.”45 This is especially true if the condition being insisted upon
was important and could have reasonably been included in the preliminary

of intent, only that it required they do so in good faith and actively engage in the negotiation
process).
38. 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
39. Id. at 498 (emphasis added). The court also stated that the obligation to negotiate in good
faith prevents a party from “insisting on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary
agreement.” Id. At the same time, the court recognized that the duty to negotiate in good faith does
not necessarily guarantee a binding agreement. According to the court:
[The good faith] obligation does not guarantee that the final contract will be concluded
if both parties comport with their obligation, as good faith differences in the negotiation
of the open issues may prevent a reaching of final contract. . . . The obligation does,
however, bar a party from renouncing the deal, abandoning the negotiations, or
insisting on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement.
Id.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 500–01 (emphasis added).
42. 145 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 1998).
43. Id. at 548 (emphasis added); see also EQT Infrastructure Ltd. v. Smith, 861 F. Supp. 2d 220,
232 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that the insistence on a condition that was not provided in the letter
of intent—that the seller find a buyer for another asset—can indicate absence of good faith); Juanes
v. Lyzwinski, 875 F. Supp. 2d 155, 162 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at
498) (stating that a refusal to agree to terms in a preliminary agreement and attempts to add terms
may indicate lack of good faith).
44. 420 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2005).
45. Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (quoting Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548).
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document. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in A/S Apothekernes
Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chemical Group, Inc.46
that the obligation to negotiate in good faith “can only be determined from
the framework the parties have established for themselves in their letter of
intent.”47 In SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc.,48 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the prospective licensor, “SIGA[,] failed to
negotiate in good faith for a definitive license agreement in accordance
with the terms of the [term sheet].”49
In sum, preliminary agreements serve to regulate negotiations by
limiting the freedom of the parties to depart from terms settled therein, and
the courts are willing to enforce this intent in their application of the good
faith or best efforts standard. This central feature of the duty to negotiate in
good faith has not been examined in legal scholarship and remains
underspecified. Parties to a preliminary agreement are in the midst of
negotiating their deal, and it is therefore unlikely that they intend to set in
stone the terms on which they have agreed at that point. But, their invocation
of legally enforceable negotiation duties signals their intent to give
considerable weight to these terms. Good faith negotiation requires fidelity
to terms specified in the preliminary agreement. It is not absolute, thereby
making the preliminary terms sticky rather than fixed. In any given dispute,
the court is called upon to assess (a) the degree of deviation and (b) the
46. 873 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 159.
48. 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013).
49. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). Following the release of the SIGA opinion, lawyers at Fried
Frank wrote that abandonment of negotiations without good faith or insistence on materially
inconsistent terms with respect to those featured in the term sheet constitute a breach of the
obligation to negotiate in good faith, especially if there is evidence of regret. ANDREW J. COLOSIMO
ET AL., FRIED, FRANK, HARRIS, SHRIVER & JACOBSON LLP, PRACTICE POINTS FOR TERM SHEETS,
LETTERS OF INTENT, AND UNDERTAKINGS TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH—BASED ON
DELAWARE SUPREME COURT’S SIGA DECISION 4 (2016), https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles
/Publications/FINALv8-2-8-2016-Practice%20Points%20on%20Use%20of%20Term%20Sheets
%20and%20Letters%20of%20Intent.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ7R-EYHY]. However, Fried Frank
noted that a good faith disagreement on a material term not included within the parties’ letter of
intent is not likely to constitute a breach. Id. Lawyers at Lincoln Gustafson wrote that the good faith
obligation would be breached by “attempt[s] to change fundamental points of the deal in order to
take advantage of changing external conditions and extract more favorable terms than were initially
agreed upon in the letter of intent.” Patrick Klingborg, When a “Non-Binding” Letter of Intent Is
Binding After All, LINCOLN, GUSTAFSON & CERCOS, LLP (June 1, 2016), http://
www.lgclawoffice.com/when-a-non-binding-letter-of-intent-is-binding-after-all/ [https://perma.cc
/D2WQ-PFZX]. While the decision in SIGA came as a surprise to many practitioners, it was not
unprecedented. In RGC International Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., No. CIV.A.17674,
2001 WL 984689 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2001), for example, the parties had expressly agreed to
negotiate in good faith and the Delaware Chancery Court held that this was breached when the
defendant broke off negotiations. Id. at *1; see also Glob. Asset Capital, LLC v. Rubicon US REIT,
Inc., No. 5071-VCL, at *4, 14 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 2009) (order granting temporary restraining order)
(stating that “the duty to negotiate in good faith . . . is one that this Court recognizes, is one that is
of commercial importance, and is one that this Court will protect” and that “radio silence is not
negotiating in good faith”).
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justification for such deviation. A coherent framework for making these
assessments is lacking and we provide such a framework in Part II by
examining the parties’ objectives in preliminary agreements.
A number of federal and state court opinions—as well as legal
scholars—state that a goal of the duty to negotiate in good faith is to protect
and encourage efficient deal- or relationship-specific investments and
minimize the risk of opportunistic holdup behavior. An example is the
statement in a recent First Circuit opinion that:
Modern transactions often involve significant up-front investments in
deal structuring and due diligence, and parties may wish to protect
those investments in some measure. Without any such protection, a
rapacious counter-party may attempt to take advantage of the other
party’s sunk investment by trying to retool the deal at the last minute.50
Indeed, some courts suggest that judicial enforcement of a contract to
negotiate is inapt—even in the face of bad faith—in the absence of significant
reliance in between the contracting stages; these are likely to be treated as
mere agreements to agree.51 As we explain in section II(C)(2), reliance is an
incomplete rationale for the good faith duty: parties often make specific
investments in negotiations and deal preparation without contractual
protection52 and the good faith duty also promotes other goals.

50. Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 615 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Brown v.
Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that enforcement of preliminary agreements
encourages up-front investments by ensuring that counterparties will benefit from at least some
protection during the negotiation of a fully enforceable agreement); Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v.
Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 408–09 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[M]any state courts . . . have recognized
the pragmatism and commercial necessity of recognizing such agreements . . . .”); Venture Assocs.
Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 279–80 (7th Cir. 1996) (seller could demand a higher
price “provided that it was not trying to scuttle the deal or take advantage of costs sunk by Venture
in the negotiating process”) (citation omitted); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr.
2d 875, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding enforceable an agreement to negotiate in good faith and
concluding that “damages for breach of a contract to negotiate an agreement are measured by the
injury the plaintiff suffered in relying on the defendant to negotiate in good faith”).
51. See, e.g., Burbach Broad. Co., 278 F.3d at 407 (asserting that “courts will not find
enforceable binding contracts” from an “unspecified agreement to agree at some time in the future”);
Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 815–18 (7th Cir. 1987) (raising concern about making
transactions riskier without need to protect reliance).
52. Judge Easterbrook, for example, writing the majority opinion for the Seventh Circuit in
Empro Manufacturing Co. v. Ball-Co Manufacturing, Inc., 870 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1989), observed
that:
Empro [the buyer of business assets] claims that it is entitled at least to recover its
“reliance expenditures”, but the only expenditures it has identified are those normally
associated with pre-contractual efforts . . . “in negotiating with defendants, in
investigating and reviewing defendants’ business, and in preparing to acquire
defendants’ business.” Outlays of this sort cannot bind the other side any more than
paying an expert to tell you whether the painting at the auction is a genuine Rembrandt
compels the auctioneer to accept your bid.
Id. at 426.
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Judicial pronouncements as to the appropriate measure of damages for
the breach of the good faith duty also reflect the presence of justifications
other than reliance. Where the protection of specific investment motivates
the arguments in favor of contracts to negotiate in good faith, reliance
damages are the usual measure.53 However, a number of opinions have
indicated that expectation damages may be appropriate if the plaintiff
provides evidence that good faith efforts would have led to an agreement and
if the terms of that hypothetical agreement are clear enough that such
damages can be calculated.54 As we discuss in the next part, the openness to
expectation damages reflects a recognition that parties use preliminary
agreements to pursue objectives other than the protection of specific
investment, including the allocation of some risks. Other scholars have
focused on the objective of protecting reliance. We believe that, while the
goals vary across contexts, reliance protection by itself is in fact not usually
the driving goal. We present a more complete framework in Parts II and III.

53. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17 (Zachary Wolfe ed.,
4th ed. 2019) (stating that a party’s specific investment includes its opportunity losses that may be
compensated for in the measure of reliance damages); infra subpart II(D).
54. These courts generally require that the plaintiff show that an agreement would have been
reached if the defendant had bargained in good faith (causation requirement) and provide sufficient
evidence as to the terms that would have been agreed to (reasonable certainty requirement). In these
two requirements, the courts are simply applying the common law conditions of causation and
reasonable certainty. See Venture Assocs., 96 F.3d at 278 (“[I]f the plaintiff can prove that had it
not been for the defendant’s bad faith the parties would have made a final contract, then the loss of
the benefit of the contract is a consequence of the defendant’s bad faith, and, provided that it is a
foreseeable consequence, the defendant is liable for that loss—liable, that is, for the plaintiff’s
consequential damages.”); see also Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Ormesa Geothermal,
791 F. Supp. 401, 415–16 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that defendant breached its duty to negotiate in
good faith and that plaintiff’s damages were mathematically straightforward); Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he borrower
undertook a binding commitment to negotiate open terms in good faith and breached that
commitment.”); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1235–36
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that defendants breached their duty of good faith and that plaintiff was
entitled to damages calculated from the difference in interest rates); United House of Prayer for All
People v. Therrien Waddell, Inc., 112 A.3d 330, 345 (D.C. 2015) (explaining that expectation
damages are appropriate if the trial court finds that a contract would have been concluded if the
defendant had acted in good faith and that there is a basis for calculating lost profits); SIGA Techs.,
Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 350–51 (Del. 2013) (holding that if the parties have an
agreement to negotiate in good faith and the judge makes a factual finding supported by the record
that the parties would have reached an agreement but for the bad faith negotiation of one party, then
the other party is entitled to expectation damages); RGC Int’l Inv’rs v. Greka Energy Corp., No.
CIV.A.17674, 2001 WL 984689, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2001) (holding that it was bad faith for
the defendant to attempt to force the plaintiff to give up a specifically negotiated provision in the
Term Sheet); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(damages are measured by “the loss . . . caused by [the other party’s] failure or deficiency, plus . . .
any other loss . . . caused by the breach”); id. § 352 (“Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond
an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”).
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II.

The Structure of Multistage Contracting
Two challenges face commercial parties in designing the process of
contracting in multiple stages. The first is whether a court will accurately find
manifest intent to create or disclaim a contract to negotiate in good faith or
with best efforts. This challenge is the focus of lawyers’ advice to clients but
the easier of the two, especially given that parties can create or disclaim such
a duty through an express agreement. The second, and more significant,
challenge is that the parties should determine what effect they wish to assign
to their preliminary agreement. In many cases, the parties give this second
question insufficient consideration, and they are often confused or of two
minds. They may simply want to get the best of both worlds by binding their
counterparty while preserving their own freedom to walk. Or, they would like
some mutual constraint but are unsure about how much and how to combine
legal with nonlegal means to achieve it. In this Article, we focus on two
questions facing the parties in any given transaction: (1) how sticky should
the preliminary provisions be and (2) what mechanism (legal or extralegal)
should make these provisions sticky? To begin with, we ask why parties often
conduct negotiations in stages and why they may choose to use a preliminary
document.
A.

Why and How to Sequence Negotiations
The negotiation agenda, including the sequencing of issues, can affect
the deal outcome and, indeed, may be the subject of bargaining over
process.55 In many cases, negotiations are sequenced, and a subset of issues
is addressed at each stage. If nothing else, sequencing is a response to
cognitive barriers to negotiating all issues at once. There is a trade-off
between the benefit of being able to logroll across issues to exploit
differences in preferences and endowments and the cognitive load of doing
so.56 When deals are broken up into manageable parts, how the issues are
55. Game theorists have shown that the decision to negotiate issues simultaneously or
sequentially is likely to affect the probability of success and the negotiated outcome. See, e.g.,
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 31 (1960) (stating that when two objects to
negotiate are done so simultaneously, the outcome is affected); Mehmet Bac & Horst Raff, Issueby-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference, 13 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
125, 125 (1996) (noting that the American Automobile Association encourages buyers to first focus
on negotiating the price of a car, deferring discussion of financing, factory rebates, and trade-in
allowance); P.V. Balakrishnan et al., Toward a Theory of Agenda Setting in Negotiations, 19 J.
CONSUMER RES. 637, 648–49 (1993) (implying a preference for simultaneous or sequential
negotiations if an asymmetric power relationship is present); Chaim Fershtman, The Importance of
the Agenda in Bargaining, 2 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 224, 237 (1990) (showing that parties’
differences in preferred outcomes will affect their behavior in sequential negotiations); Younghwan
In & Roberto Serrano, Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
385 (2004) (arguing that bundling offers can prevent parties from exploiting trade-offs among issues
in a negotiation).
56. See HOWARD RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 91 (2002) (describing the cognitive difficulty of negotiating
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divided and sequenced is a distinct and important question. One approach is
that of gradualism or incrementalism, under which easier issues are settled
first in order to build trust and a positive atmosphere, to create “momentum”
to face the more difficult issues in subsequent stages.57 The terms that are
more difficult to resolve are more likely to be the major terms that, in turn,
courts are more likely to require in an enforceable contract to negotiate.58
An alternative strategy moves in the opposite direction, tackling first the
potential roadblocks associated with essential terms before time is spent on
the easier matters. This seems to be a common sequence in corporate
transactions. Together with early diligence, agreement on the main deal
terms—particularly price and deal structure—ensures and signals that the
parties are confident they have found the right partner.59 The benefit of this
sequencing is reinforced by the need for costly lawyers, accountants,
architects, consultants, and other experts. It makes sense to have the essential
elements of the bargain reflect the prospect of a profitable transaction before
these investments are incurred. Although the first stage addresses the major
terms—such as what is being sold and at what price—the second stage is not
trivial. Even if the second stage consists of lawyers hammering out
representations and warranties, covenants, closing conditions, remedies, and
termination rights, these can contribute significant value to the transaction.60
Yet, because essential terms are settled first, a key question is the degree to
which the parties can adjust them in negotiating the second stage.

multiple issues at once).
57. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 390 (2004) (“[Parties sometimes leave] issues that were difficult
to resolve for future completion. In these situations, contractual incompleteness is neither a result
of haste nor of unforeseeability, but rather a deliberate choice to temporarily disagree over some
matters, to sidestep difficult issues over which consensus could not be reached.”).
58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
59. While the common sequence in corporate transactions is to agree on pricing and deal
structure provisions first and then negotiate on other nonprice terms, many transactions are
negotiated in the reverse order. In corporate public debt or equity transactions, for instance, parties
agree on the nonprice terms before the pricing of the instrument. See infra note 63 and
accompanying text.
60. The value that lawyers contribute may be difficult to quantify but, notwithstanding the
aphorism to “let the lawyers take care of the details,” the fact that they can command significant
hourly rates for work performed after preliminary documents suggests that the market values their
contributions to contracts in the second stage. The various substantive rights and obligations added
in the second stage can significantly affect the value and successful execution of the deal. For
instance, in an M&A transaction, whether the target can entertain a third-party bid (as stipulated in
the “no-shop” clause) or whether the buyer can walk away from the deal when the target suffers a
materially adverse event (as defined in the “material adverse change” clause) will bear on the
likelihood of successful closing of the deal. While some intermediate agreements, such as letters of
intent and term sheets, contain exclusivity or no-shop clauses, other clauses, such as warranties,
closing conditions and termination rights are negotiated in the later stage and appear in the definitive
agreement. See Choi & Triantis, Strategic Vagueness, supra note 9, at 863–66, 870–72 (explaining
material-change clauses, reverse termination fees, and other termination rights).
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The sequencing of the monetary price of a transaction is particularly
interesting, especially to the degree that it is difficult to revise a settled price
(because of the enforcement of the duty to bargain or other constraints).61
Price is usually a critical deal term and unique in two important respects.
First, it is likely to be the most divisible consideration in a contract: it can be
adjusted by dollars while a quality measure cannot. Second, it is typically the
distributional term in the contract with the least impact on the size of the
aggregate contracting surplus. In some transactions, price is set after the
nonprice (often the lawyers’) terms have been set: for example, master
agreements for services or goods that are followed by agreements (such as
purchase orders) that specify quantity and price. Many other business
transactions set price before nonprice terms. For example, in commercial
loans, private equity investments, and corporate acquisitions, many terms are
agreed upon after the price is settled: representations and warranties,
covenants, termination rights, choice of law and forum, etc.62 In the first stage
of these negotiations, the parties agree to price and key nonprice provisions,
often without their lawyers, and then turn over the second stage to their
lawyers to work out these contractual details. These terms, though valuable,
are usually settled without adjustment to price. This arrangement leads to a
peculiar process in the second bargaining stage between lawyers in which the
parties are limited to bartering nonprice provisions.63 The stickiness of price
constrains the ability of the parties to maximize the efficiency of their
contract design, particularly when the parties are not using standard or market
terms.64 They cannot adjust their terms to respond fully to either new
information or changes in their environment. Yet, as explained below in
subpart II(C), the parties must balance the risk of these ex post efficiency
losses against a variety of ex ante efficiency advantages from constraining
61. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design,
98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1694–95 (2012) (explaining how bargaining power might affect nonprice
contract terms if price is settled first).
62. But see JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 59 (1975) (suggesting that a seller’s counsel should
delay agreement on purchase price until other material terms have been settled).
63. It is interesting in this respect to contrast two types of debt contracts that settle price early
or late in the process. In a typical commercial bank loan, the parties first negotiate a term sheet that
contains the maturity, interest rate, and other fees, in addition to a handful of major terms. The
interest rate is rarely changed subsequently during the negotiation of the covenants, etc. In contrast,
in the sale of a bond or debenture, the covenants are settled before the price is determined. Given
the advantages of the price term and constraints on nonprice bartering identified in the text, one
might speculate that, all else equal, the design of bond covenants would be more efficient. One
might also anticipate more innovation in the provisions of nonbank debt, where the market can
reward valuable contract terms with a lower yield.
64. Moreover, it is generally perceived that the second stage presents the opportunity for the
party with the bargaining power at that stage to seize more rents because the price cannot be
reopened. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 61, at 1694 (suggesting that “bargaining power is a
determinant of the nonprice terms” in this context because of “the inability to trade off risk
allocation against a price adjustment”).
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flexibility. Overall, we describe a framework under which parties agree to
distributional parameters and allocating some risks in the preliminary
agreement, while working toward maximizing the contracting surplus in their
final contract.
B.

Purpose of Preliminary Agreements
When the parties choose to divide their negotiations into multiple stages,
there is a separate question as to whether and when to memorialize their
progress, as well as whether to give such memorialization any legal impact.
The most straightforward sense in which they may choose to invoke a legal
obligation is in express provisions that regulate their negotiation process.65 If
the parties anticipate continuing their diligence investigation after the
preliminary agreement, the party being investigated may agree to cooperate
by releasing relevant, nonpublic information while the investigating party
may promise to keep information confidential.66 Promises of confidentiality
and nondisclosure are common. The parties may also agree to a period of
exclusivity (or “no shop”), during which they agree not to shop, solicit, or
discuss a similar transaction with any third party.67 There is little doubt that
the parties can enter into these binding promises, and their advantage is
relatively clear. The focus of this Article is the obligation to negotiate in good
faith, which may be provided for in combination with such other express
terms that the parties intend to be legally binding.68 As we have emphasized
in this Article, the central feature of the good faith duty lends some degree of
stickiness to the deal terms that are included in the preliminary document.
The decision to sequence negotiations presumably requires that the firststage terms would have to be somewhat settled before beginning the second
65. An exclusivity agreement will, for instance, prohibit one or both parties from negotiating
with a third party. Under another type of agreement, one party (e.g., the seller) promises to disclose
various nonpublic information for the purpose of due diligence while the agreement also imposes a
confidentiality obligation on the recipient not to disclose or misuse such information. ABA, MODEL
MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 345–52, 385–88. Parties may include either or both
exclusivity or confidentiality obligations within a preliminary agreement, such as a letter of intent
that may additionally obligate the parties to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., JamSports & Entm’t,
LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828–29 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (documenting a letter
of intent that bound the parties to negotiate exclusively with one another and in good faith). In some
cases, the exclusivity and duty to bargain is phrased more categorically. See, e.g., Channel Home
Ctrs., Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 1986) (detailing a letter
of intent that covered most of the significant shopping mall lease terms and provided that the
prospective lessor would “withdraw the Store from the rental market, and only negotiate the . . .
leasing transaction to completion”).
66. ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 345–52.
67. Id. at 385–88.
68. In some preliminary agreements, the parties rely on specific provisions without the duty to
bargain in good faith. See, e.g., Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co., 169 P.3d 1255, 1262 (Or. 2007) (stating
that, without any obligation to bargain in good faith towards a completed sale, the seller agreed to
provide due diligence documents within a specified time in consideration for the buyer’s promise
to review the documents in good faith).
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stage. Otherwise, how would the parties maintain the psychological benefits
of a gradual compromise or the fragmentation of complex issues referred to
above? What would be the value of addressing roadblocks first if they could
reappear later in the negotiations? Moreover, parties would negotiate more
seriously before the preliminary agreement if they knew that there would be
a cost to renegotiating or walking away from its terms. Presumably,
memorializing the settled terms for the benefit of future negotiations supports
this staging process. A related purpose of the memorialization of a term sheet
is to communicate the settled terms with third parties who were not part of
the negotiations,69 and this requires some degree of understanding that the
counterparty is not at liberty to insist on significant changes in these terms.
One view held by deal lawyers is that preliminary agreements are
“signposts. They mark a moment in the deal’s lifecycle when enough
uncertainty and complexity has been resolved that the deal is likely to go
forward . . . . [They are] markers for the accumulation of deal momentum.”70
According to this view, these documents are not legally binding; instead, they
indicate that momentum has been achieved and that a completed deal is
prospectively along the lines of the thereto settled terms.71 The parties use
this information as a sign that they can proceed to incur further negotiation
costs.72 Indeed, these preliminary documents serve as evidence and provide
information to the deal team of lawyers, accountants, and other advisers, as
well as lenders, investors, and other third parties who will contribute to the
project.73 In this respect, commentators sometimes refer to these preliminary
documents as mechanisms for “organizing” these third parties.74
69. For instance, in corporate-acquisition transactions where financing is involved, the
purchaser will often forward the preliminary agreement to the investors and underwriters so as to
line up the necessary financing before closing the sale.
70. Hwang, supra note 12, at 382–83; see also Alan P.W. Konevsky, A US Perspective on the
Risks of Term Sheets, 26 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 353, 353 (2011) (noting that
practitioners frequently affirm that preliminary agreements foster a moral commitment between the
parties and create deal momentum).
71. Of course, the signal of momentum is not a particularly reliable one in the economic sense
because it is relatively cheap (or even costless) to send unless there is some sanction, legal or
nonlegal, on the party that deviates from the terms of the agreement, thereby rendering them “sticky”
to some degree.
72. See, e.g., 2 ABA, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 91 (explaining
that letters of intent are used “to test the waters” for the prospects of a definitive agreement “before
incurring the costs of negotiating a definitive agreement”).
73. Included in these third parties are regulators whose approvals are condition precedent to the
closing of the deals and who need the time to review (e.g., antitrust review). 2 COMM. ON
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH
COMMENTARY 118 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 12, at 408–09 (entering a preliminary agreement serves both
an internal and external organizational purpose); Ralph B. Lake, Letters of Intent: A Comparative
Examination Under English, U.S., French, and West German Law, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. &
ECON. 331, 332 (1984) (explaining that letters of intent assist in “bringing order to the complexity”);
see also 1 COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY 165 (2001) (explaining that the parties promise to cooperate in
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In our analysis, the content of the duty to negotiate in good faith depends
on the content of the memorialized deal terms and the court’s determination
of the degree of flexibility that the parties had to adjust them in subsequent
negotiations. As noted in Part I, courts repeatedly refer to this central feature
in holding that the parties must negotiate the subsequent stage “within the
scope of,” “within the terms specified in,” “in accordance with,” or
“incorporating the agreed terms in” the preliminary agreements.75 Given that
the parties need flexibility to complete their negotiations and design the
optimal terms of exchange, the optimal stickiness is a matter of degree and
of type. As we elaborate in the next section, when the parties conclude their
search for the right partner, they enter into a preliminary agreement to
crystallize, at least to some degree, the distribution of (expected) contracting
surplus, while they incentivize investment in designing the optimal terms of
trade that will maximize that surplus. The imposition of a duty to bargain in
good faith may provide a useful, costly signal of each party’s confidence that
they have searched and found the appropriate counterparty.76 The stickiness
can accomplish several other objectives: encouragement of reliance
investments, deterrence of wasteful bargaining behavior, and allocation of
risks. We refer to these collectively as ex ante efficiency considerations,
while we refer to the optimization of deal terms and exchange as ex post
efficiency.77 We describe these goals and the balancing objective in the next
section.
C.

Stickiness of Settled Terms in Preliminary Agreements
We have identified the stickiness of deal provisions in preliminary
agreements as a key element of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. In
this section, we discuss how the parties might choose the optimal degree of
stickiness by balancing ex post and ex ante efficiency considerations. Then,
in Part III, we address the parties’ choice between legal and nonlegal
mechanisms to achieve their desired stickiness of preliminary terms.
Contracting parties would opt for legal enforcement of their preliminary
terms, through a duty to bargain in good faith or otherwise, if (a) they wished
their terms to be sticky and (b) they preferred legal to nonlegal measures to
achieve this. The optimal answers to these questions vary across
obtaining necessary consents and regulatory approvals).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 38–49.
76. Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 401, 403 (1988).
77. We are adopting the labels used in contract theory. Although the delineation between ex post
versus ex ante efficiency is sometimes unclear in the literature, the purpose is to distinguish between
the parties’ behavior before a given event, such as realization of a market shock or arrival of new
information that changes the optimal terms, and behavior after the event. For instance, the parties
could perform a due diligence investigation (ex ante behavior) that could lead to discovery of new
information that they could attempt to use to modify the deal terms or deal structure (ex post
behavior).
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circumstances, which is why we observe good faith duties in some
preliminary agreements but not in others.
The less sticky the preliminary terms, the more flexibility is available to
the parties to optimize the terms of the contract at the end of negotiations so
as to maximize the contractual surplus (ex post efficiency), given the
conditions that exist at the conclusion of their negotiations. However,
stickiness in major deal terms promotes three types of ex ante efficiency
goals: (1) encouraging relationship- or deal-specific investment that helps
them identify those (ex post) optimal terms; (2) discouraging inefficient
surplus-grabbing or rent-seeking behavior; and (3) promoting efficient
allocation of risk that may arise from changes in circumstances. We discuss
the ex post and ex ante efficiencies below.
1. Flexibility and Ex Post Efficiency.—Contracting parties typically do
not wish to make the terms of their preliminary agreements fully binding
because they need flexibility to accommodate another significant stage in
negotiation.78 Given the requirements that contract law imposes, even on
consensual modifications to binding contracts,79 the parties have greater
flexibility if they agree to negotiate in good faith from preliminary terms
rather than if they enter into a binding contract with the view of subsequently
modifying it.80 Simply put, when the parties fail to modify an existing
contract, they will be bound by the initial terms; whereas if they fail to modify
a nonbinding preliminary agreement, they can walk away from the deal. This
flexibility is particularly important if the parties anticipate that they will
acquire new information, or be subject to changed circumstances, that would
reveal a more efficient transactional structure or set of terms or that the
transaction is inefficient under any terms. In a corporate acquisition, for
instance, when the parties expect to uncover new information through the due
diligence process or face an unforeseen hurdle in obtaining regulatory or
78. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 384 (“[M]ost preliminary agreements in M&A deals are signed
but non-binding.”). Hwang also notes that deals are sticky even though enforcement for breach is
weak. Id.
79. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, an enforceable contract modification requires not
only mutual assent but also good faith which, between merchants, includes observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. U.C.C. § 2-209 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2017). Although new consideration is no longer necessary to support an enforceable
contract modification, “modifications . . . must meet the test of good faith imposed by [U.C.C. § 1304].” Id. Further:
The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract terms is
barred, and the extortion of a “modification” without legitimate commercial reason is
ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor can a mere technical
consideration support a modification made in bad faith.
Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) cmt c. (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
80. Although contract law requires the parties to negotiate in good faith when they are
modifying an existing contract, modifying a contract will be more difficult than negotiating a newly
binding one because at least one of the parties is “guaranteed” to realize a return from the existing
contract. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 10–14.
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shareholder approval, it becomes particularly important for them to remain
flexible to accommodate the future challenges.81 Any stickiness in the initial
terms—especially price terms, as noted above—limits the opportunities to
logroll and agree to all efficient terms.82 This flexibility should not be
surrendered without the existence of offsetting benefits from imposing legal
weight on settled terms.
Contract theorists generally presume that commercially sophisticated
parties are able to renegotiate when new information comes to light.83 The
parties agree to adjust previously settled terms and implement the deal
structure that is ex post efficient, even if the settled terms are fully binding.
However, this relies on assumptions that the new information is revealed at
no cost, there are no obstacles to modification, and the parties symmetrically
acquire information in the renegotiation stage. These assumptions obscure
important differences between renegotiating a legally binding agreement and
a newly enforceable contract. They are also stylized and not borne out in
reality. Indeed, one can readily imagine scenarios in which costly
renegotiation would not take place. Suppose, for example, that the cost of
diligence and renegotiation to reveal and adjust to new information must be
borne by one of the parties in the amount of $7. If the modified terms would
increase the joint surplus by $10 and the parties enjoy even bargaining power
(so as to enjoy a $5 incremental surplus each), this party would not have the
incentive to invest.
Even if a contracting party has the incentive to invest in diligence and
modification efforts, there may be another type of inefficiency arising from
the private information it acquires about the ex post optimal deal terms.84 On
this basis, the party would propose a modification with a new or additional
deal term. The uninformed counterparty, however, would not know whether
the proposed term is surplus increasing in fact or the informed party is acting
opportunistically by attempting to sell a term at a higher price than it is
81. The recent experience of Walgreens and Rite Aid is illustrative. Initially, the parties entered
into a merger agreement, subject to regulatory and shareholder approval conditions. But when they
faced a significant antitrust challenge, they decided to change the structure of the transaction so as
to allow Walgreens to purchase a fraction of Rite Aid stores as an asset purchase instead of a merger.
See Walgreens Boots All., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 29, 2017) (stating in Item 7.01
that Walgreens had made a new agreement with Rite Aid to purchase stores and other assets—an
agreement that replaced and revoked the previous merger agreements between the two companies).
82. Modifying or renegotiating the price term is considered to be more difficult because the
price term deals more with how the contractual surplus is being divided between the parties. Hence,
modifying the price term tends to create a zero-sum bargaining structure. By contrast, nonprice
terms tend to affect both the size of the contractual surplus and its division.
83. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28, at 703 (stating that one party’s investment may
yield information that makes a project profitable, leading to a potential renegotiation between the
parties).
84. Investment in due diligence yields a combination of symmetric and private information. For
instance, a buyer of goods can uncover not only information that the seller knows but also some
information that the seller does not know. The discussion in this paragraph concerns the private
information revealed to the investigating party.
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worth.85 For example, a seller may attempt to use its superior information
about the value of warranties to a buyer to dupe the buyer into accepting a
broader (but unnecessary) warranty at a higher price. Anticipating this rentseeking incentive, the uninformed party may rationally reject any offer of a
term from the informed party, even when it may be in fact efficient. The
prospect of such renegotiation failure raises an obstacle to (ex post) efficient
modification, which the parties would want to address ex ante.
Staged contracting can affect the impact of asymmetric information in
interesting ways. The hazard from asymmetric information is greater if the
terms of the preliminary agreement are fully binding because a fully binding
agreement to transact ensures the informed party its expected profit under
that deal.86 The informed party may thereby have little or nothing to lose by
opportunistically offering new terms solely to extract a larger surplus from
the counterparty.87 If the uninformed party rejects the offer, the informed
party can simply fall back on the initial terms and still realize its expected
profit. Similarly, if the uninformed party can fall back on its expected profit
from the initial agreement, it can afford to be more skeptical of the new
proposal and much more inclined to simply reject the modification proposals.
In short, given this skepticism in the presence of asymmetric information, it
could be (often prohibitively) difficult for the parties to renegotiate the fully
binding initial terms so as to adopt a more efficient set of terms.
In contrast, if the terms of the preliminary agreement are not binding,
the incentive of the informed seller to dupe a buyer into a broad warranty
term is at least partially attenuated because neither party has an enforceable
contract to fall back on. In this case, if the uninformed party rejects the
proposed terms, the parties no longer have a deal, and neither party will be
able to capture any contractual surplus. While such a downside risk can go a
long way in terms of deterring the informed party’s opportunism, it may not
be sufficient, especially when the extra return an informed party can realize
by acting opportunistically is substantial.88 There is no easy way of guarding
85. More precisely, if the due diligence investigation would produce relevant private
information with less-than-certain probability and only the investigating party is aware of the
acquisition of information, the counterparty (the uninformed party) would not know whether it is
dealing with a party that indeed has the relevant information to increase the contractual surplus or
with a party that does not have the information but is merely attempting to grab more contractual
surplus.
86. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 11–16.
87. More precisely, even if the informed party knows that the proposed terms will not increase
the contractual surplus for both parties, given that the terms will allow the informed party to grab a
larger fraction of the surplus and that the uninformed party’s rejection will simply allow the
informed party to realize the profit under the initial terms, the informed party has little or no
incentive not to (opportunistically) offer the new terms. The uninformed party, rationally expecting
this, will likely reject all modification offers, and this will, in the end, prevent the parties from
engaging in efficient renegotiation.
88. For instance, if the uninformed party, trusting the deterrence incentive based on the
downside risk, were to always accept the modification proposal, there is no reason for the informed
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against such opportunistic behavior under these conditions (except perhaps
for simply walking away completely from the deal, which could be
inefficient).
The intermediate regime—a Type II preliminary agreement with the
duty to negotiate in good faith or best efforts—can better address the problem
of (re)negotiation failure in many circumstances. It does so by punishing the
party who attempts to renegotiate the terms of the initial agreement solely for
the purpose of extracting rent from the counterparty. Under the good faith
standard, the parties invite the future court to examine the motives behind the
informed party’s new proposal by asking whether the informed party acted
dishonestly. They thereby create a new avenue for the uninformed party to
police the informed party’s opportunism that is valuable, as we explain in
Part III below, even when judicial enforcement is costly and error-prone.89
When the parties are reassured that opportunistic behavior is deterred, it is
easier for them to supplement or modify the terms when it is in fact efficient
to do so. Furthermore, when the parties realize that the deal is no longer
efficient, given that the initial agreement is not binding, they are not stuck
with a fully binding initial agreement; they can avoid liability if they
negotiate in good faith.
2. Relationship-Specific Investment and Ex Ante Efficiency.—As
indicated earlier, the conventional justification given for enforcing
negotiation duties in preliminary agreements is to protect and encourage
relationship-specific or reliance investments that would increase the expected
deal surplus.90 Often, the investment contemplated by courts, scholars, and
lawyers is the cost of negotiating and contracting over the terms of the deal,
conducting due diligence, and retaining experts to advise on performance
(lenders, consultants, architects, etc.).91 The classic concern of contract
party not to act opportunistically. Hence, the uninformed party still needs to reject the modification
proposal with some frequency.
89. In fact, the cost of dispute resolution (borne by the party behaving opportunistically) can
function as an additional deterrent. At the same time, the dispute resolution cost on the uninformed
party will function as a screen against frivolous or meritless litigation.
90. In a short essay in the first issue of the Negotiation Journal of the Harvard Law School
Program on Negotiation, Howard Raiffa suggested a process by which parties who had entered into
a negotiated settlement would jointly go to an intervenor (from a “Contract Embellishment
Service”) who would propose an alternative that would replace the original one only if both parties
would prefer it over the original. For her efforts, the intervenor might be paid a slice of the extra
surplus she created. The intervenor would meet separately with each party and keep the content of
conversations in strict confidence, in order to create incentives for honest disclosure. Howard Raiffa,
Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOT. J. 9, 9–10 (1985). This Article addresses the more common
version of this idea: the parties reach an agreement on the basics and then seek to increase the surplus
through joint effort rather than retaining an intervenor.
91. “Without such legal recognition, parties would be obliged to expend enormous sums
negotiating every detail of final contract documentation before knowing whether they have an
agreement, and if so, on what terms.” Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670
F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Hwang, supra note 12, at 389 (“Some enforcement of
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theory is that if price is negotiated or renegotiated after one party has made
such reliance investment, the other party may engage in a holdup to deprive
the investing party of the expected return on its investment. Anticipating such
holdup, the investing party would decline to make even a beneficial
investment. If the terms of the bargain have not been settled, this holdup
hazard may go unchecked, so the parties may wish that the courts police it by
enforcing an agreement to negotiate in good faith.
In their article on preliminary agreements, Alan Schwartz and Robert
Scott focus on a similar problem. They examine incentives in “exploratory”
preliminary agreements, under which the parties agree to make simultaneous
investment in information that would reveal whether and which among a set
of contemplated projects would be profitable to pursue.92 For example, a
seller would investigate its cost of delivering a good and the buyer would
investigate the value it would receive, and the parties would then share the
acquired information to determine whether the contemplated trade is
efficient. Without enforcement of the promise to invest, each party has the
incentive to cheat: to let the other party invest first and decide later whether
to invest.93 The authors believe that the good faith duty can encourage
investment by ordering the reneging party to pay the reasonable costs of the
performing party’s preliminary investment.94 Schwartz and Scott remark that
the predominant legal approach, via the contract to negotiate, “is deficient,
however, because it is unnecessary to require parties to bargain in good faith.
As we show, efficiency would be enhanced if the law were simply to protect
the promisee’s reliance interest.”95 In their analysis, they assume that the
reliance expenditure is (at least partially) verifiable, as is its reasonableness,
so the good faith standard is an unnecessarily indirect means to create the
efficient investment incentive.96 To the extent that what the parties really care
about is their investment, their contract, or the law, should obligate them to
make the reasonable amount of reliance investment. By contrast, the existing
law on preliminary agreements concerns the duty to negotiate in good faith,
and this is the obligation often expressly adopted by the contracting parties.
This suggests that the parties are likely to be more concerned about other

a preliminary agreement means that the parties can rely on their preliminary bargains as they engage
in the costly process of solving deal complexity.”). In client letters, law firms advise clients to
“determine whether they have a meeting of the minds on the material terms of a deal before
proceeding with the more detailed, prolonged, and costly effort of definitive documentation.”
COLOSIMO ET AL., supra note 49, at 2. And, to “make sure they are on the same page as to the
significant points of a deal before they undertake the time and expense to prepare a detailed contract
to express their complete agreement.” Klingborg, supra note 49.
92. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28, at 666.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 667.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 667 n.13.
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features in the process of negotiation and contract design than simply
protecting reliance investment.97
The use of preliminary agreements to protect reliance investments is
more complicated than presented in much of the commentary. Indeed,
investments that assess whether a contemplated transaction with a particular
counterparty will be profitable or that determine the basic framework of the
deal may occur before or after the preliminary agreement. Commercial
parties regularly make specific investments before entering into any
agreement and expect to recover them from the profits of completed deals.98
Contract theory is over-stylized when it posits that specific investments are
deterred by the threat of holdup.99 In fact, from a survey of counsel to merger
and acquisition deals, Cathy Hwang observes that “[s]cholars assume that
preliminary agreements are first steps . . . before investigation, and before
making relationship-specific investments. In reality, parties sign preliminary
agreements slightly later in the deal process, after most initial investigation
is done.”100 Their ability to continue conducting diligence can be enhanced

97. Schwartz and Scott also write that:
Rational parties will pursue efficient projects and abandon inefficient projects. They
will disagree, if at all, over whether a party should be compensated for a reliance
expense. If they disagree, they may call upon a court to resolve the dispute, and it
should determine whether a promise to invest simultaneously has been breached and,
if so, what fraction of the injured party’s reliance should be reimbursed.
Id. at 667. The analysis assumes that the contracting parties are symmetrically informed regarding
the contractual surplus, which, in turn, allows them to always adopt an ex post efficient arrangement.
Given their premise that the parties can always implement ex post efficient arrangement, it is not
surprising that the authors perceive the role of the court as simply to protect and encourage reliance
investment. The analysis places much confidence in the parties’ ability to achieve ex post efficiency
with the optimal deal terms. If the parties are not symmetrically informed, however, this premise
does not hold. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 4.
98. See, e.g., Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425–26 (7th Cir. 1989)
(noting that what the plaintiff characterized as “reliance expenditures” were merely expenditures
“normally associated with pre-contractual efforts”). See supra note 52. Especially with respect to
investments that are made before a contracting partner has been identified, parties could be properly
incentivized in finding the right match even without contractual protection. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423, 453, 456 (2001)
(proposing that even without precontractual liability, parties will enter negotiations where there will
be a positive surplus).
99. In explaining hold-up, contract theory conventionally assumes that (i) the investing party’s
return from within the relationship, at the margin, must be strictly higher than the return from the
market (outside the relationship), and (ii) both the outcomes of the investment (e.g., the value to the
buyer and the cost to the seller) and the cost of the investment are nonverifiable (and, hence,
noncontractible). See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 73, 75
(1995) (noting the inherent difficulty of specifying some contract terms); Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691 passim (1986) (discussing how investment costs and outcomes are often
nonverifiable and noncontractible); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 755–56 (1988) (identifying how certain elements of a deal
are nonverifiable due to the prohibitive cost of specifying them).
100. Hwang, supra note 12, at 386; see also Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1042–45 (2014) (discussing the balance in the enforcement of preliminary
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in preliminary agreements by the binding specific promises described earlier,
providing one’s counterparty with access to records and related materials, the
sharing of expenses, and adhering to nondisclosure requirements. In light of
Hwang’s finding that most of the investment in search has been completed
before the preliminary agreement, it suggests that the parties have confidence
that they have selected the optimal partner and that the transaction is likely
to be efficient.101 The open question is, under what terms? In these cases, the
significant reliance investment after the preliminary agreement is in the
negotiation and design of the deal terms that increase the shared surplus.
There is another respect in which the scholarly analysis of specific
investment is incomplete. Recognizing the holdup hazard described above,
negotiating parties may wish to provide incentives for investment in
discovering the parameters of efficient deal terms (such as the optimal
representation or warranty, closing condition, or even a revised deal
structure) that will increase the size of the transaction surplus. However,
making the preliminary terms sticky to protect such investment may lead to
another type of inefficiency. In cases in which one party’s investment
improves the other party’s return from the transaction (for instance, the seller
uncovers new warranty terms that will increase the buyer’s value),102 the
investing party will not be able to capture any benefit from the investment if
the preliminary agreement causes the other party to refuse to renegotiate the
initial terms. Moreover, as discussed in section II(C)(1) above, if the
investing party privately uncovers relevant information, the uninformed
counterparty may hesitate to renegotiate the terms due to the possibility of
being duped by the informed party. In such scenarios, the parties will face a
dual challenge of providing proper investment incentive and deterring rentextracting behavior.103 In either case, some flexibility to renegotiate the terms
(in favor of the investing party) is necessary in these cases to encourage the
beneficial investment.104

agreements between protection of reliance and flexibility to adapt contract terms to new
information).
101. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 393 (suggesting that since parties “almost always” sign a
definitive agreement after signing a preliminary agreement, new information rarely reveals that they
are not suitable partners).
102. In the contract-theory literature, this type of investment is known as “cooperative”
investment. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 125 (1999).
103. This is an example where the presence of asymmetric information and reliance investment
creates both ex ante and ex post efficiency challenges. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 3.
104. In light of the threat of holdup in contract design, it is curious that parties in many
transactions jockey to be the authors of the first draft of an agreement. There are, of course,
advantages to being the initial drafter, such as the familiarity of its team with the template document
and the tendency of negotiations to anchor on offered terms. In addition, the initial drafter of the
agreement may also acquire superior information about the deal structure that the party could exploit
to its advantage.
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3. Discouraging Inefficient Investment in Bargaining Power.—
Negotiation experts contrast strategies of value-creation and value-claiming.
The foregoing discussion concerns value-creation: how the parties can design
their deal terms to maximize their transaction surplus. Investment leading to
efficient deal terms is desirable in this respect and the parties should seek to
encourage such beneficial investment. Value-claiming strategies, in contrast,
aim to capture a larger share of the surplus by changing the perceived
bargaining range between the parties’ reservation prices. They usually entail
costly actions or investments that yield a private return to the actor at the
expense of the counterparty, yielding a net reduction in the transactional
surplus. First, a party can improve its alternatives to the agreement (known
as BATNA105), raise its reservation price, and thereby improve its share of
the surplus.106 It can do so by seeking and developing negotiations with
alternative counterparties. For instance, even though a party knows that
closing the transaction with the counterparty is efficient, it can attempt to
secure a competing offer from a third party solely for the purpose of seeking
concession from its counterparty. To be sure, investing in alternatives can
reveal a more efficient deal elsewhere, but the motivation of concern here is
to improve bargaining power. Second, one party’s selfish interest is served
by becoming better informed about its counterparty’s reservation price and
changing its counterparty’s perception of its own.107 Of course, the
counterparty has the corresponding incentive to conceal that value.
Expenditures incurred to conceal one’s own or reveal one’s counterparty’s
reservation price do not contribute to efficiency unless they produce
information relevant to whether the deal and its terms are optimal. Third, a
party may take actions to hurt the counterparty’s no-agreement alternative or
BATNA and thereby change the bargaining range in the first party’s favor.
The parties’ goal of deterring value-claiming investments is distinct
from encouraging value-creating investments. As noted earlier, incentives for
surplus-enhancing investments can be created by a simple promise to share
expenses or reimburse if the deal falls through because the party incurring
the cost has the incentive to provide evidence that they were made and were
reasonable.108 It is much more difficult to deter value-claiming investments
because they are difficult both to observe and verify. It is not surprising,
therefore, that preliminary agreements often have no-shop, no-talk, or other
exclusivity restrictions on developing alternatives during a time set for
105. BATNA stands for Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement. ROGER FISHER &
WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 101 (1981).
106. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 51, 55, 119–21 (1986) (discussing the concept of
“reservation price” and how parties can alter counterparties’ perceptions to project a more favorable
position).
107. G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 104–05 (3d ed. 2018).
108. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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negotiations alongside the contract to negotiate in good faith.109 The good
faith standard is broader than the specific exclusivity restrictions, and the
court’s investigation into the good faith or best efforts of each party can
police value-claiming behavior not caught by the specific prohibitions.110 For
example, it is easier to verify the seller’s marketing of an asset than the
buyer’s search for alternative acquisitions.
As an alternative to policing the value-claiming activities themselves,
the parties could seek to neutralize any advantage gained after the signing of
the preliminary agreement by locking in the distribution of the surplus while
encouraging the parties to invest in maximizing the surplus. Where this is an
important goal, the parties incur the loss of some logrolling flexibility by
agreeing on price terms in the preliminary stage and limiting the ability of
either party to demand a large revision in the price or other key terms. Each
party has a correspondingly limited incentive to improve its BATNA or
impair its counterparty’s BATNA. The parties might allow each other to walk
away from the deal but not to propose modified terms that shift the surplussharing proportion significantly in favor of one party or the other. Or, they
may simply close off the ability to take advantage of an outside offer in any
respect by adding an exclusivity clause.
4. Risk Allocation.—Another reason that parties may prefer stickiness in
their preliminary agreement terms—also distinct from protecting
relationship-specific investment—is to manage risks that affect the size and
distribution of the deal surplus. Risk allocation is a well-known, core function
of contracts. Even if a deal is not completely negotiated, allocating some risk
of changes in circumstances during the negotiation period may be efficient,
and there may be gains to putting this allocation in place sooner rather than
later. New circumstances or information can lead to (a) a change in the
expected distribution of the contracting surplus; (b) a change in the expected
size of the joint gains from the contemplated transaction; and (c) a change

109. See, e.g., ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 148–50 (providing a
model no-solicitation or no-shop covenant). Even with a no-shop clause, however, the target
corporation preserves the right to respond to an unsolicited offer from a third party. Whether the
target corporation can do so depends, again, on the target board’s “good faith” determination that
the third party’s offer may be superior. Hence, even with a no-shop clause, the good faith duty plays
an important role. See id. at 169–71 (regarding a target corporation’s good faith duty to negotiate
with the purchaser in response to a third party’s offer); see also NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N,
supra note 22, at 14 (including the obligation to negotiate in good faith within a term sheet’s noshop clause).
110. But see SuperValu Inc. v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 985, 992 (D. Minn.
2006) (applying Washington law) (“A generalized duty to negotiate in good faith, as found in the
language in the Letter of Intent, does not require disclosure of competing negotiations.”);
Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp., 578 N.E.2d 789, 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (citing Feldman
v. Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988)) (stating that requiring negotiating
parties to disclose their positions would be counter to the “cause of ebullient business competition”),
rev’d on other grounds, 592 N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. 1992).
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that could render the transaction inefficient. Optimally, the parties would
seek to avoid the deal in the last contingency and to preserve it in the first
and second contingencies, perhaps with modified or additional terms in the
second. Indeed, this ex ante challenge is familiar generally in the design and
enforcement of contracts in the face of changed circumstances.111 The same
principles apply to preliminary agreements and the enforcement of
obligations to bargain in good faith.
If the parties settle terms that allocate an exogenous risk, either
explicitly or implicitly, the court should enforce that allocation. In this light,
good faith may be breached when a party attempts to escape the adverse
materialization of a risk allocated to it under the preliminary agreement by
breaking off negotiations or demanding an unreasonable modification of the
agreed-upon terms.112 A party breaches its good faith obligation when it
unreasonably insists on changing the settled terms, particularly if it thereby
seeks to either escape or modify the deal because of the materialization of a
risk that was otherwise allocated to that party.113 In Venture Associates Corp.
v. Zenith Data Systems Corp.,114 Judge Posner drew a significant distinction
between preliminary terms that are “open” and “closed,” finding that the
price in the preliminary agreement in that case was an open term that the
parties could continue to negotiate.115 Parties allocate risks by agreeing to
close terms.116 Such settled terms may allocate a range of risks: from the core
terms of price to less essential legal conditions—such as the availability of
regulatory provisions like tax or accounting treatments—that may affect the
value or cost of performance to either side.
a. TIAA Cases.—The leading cases concerning agreements to negotiate
in good faith in the Southern District of New York concern loan
commitments entered into by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity
111. For instance, under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1981), contract modifications are binding when done “in view of circumstances not anticipated by
the parties when the contract was made” and no consideration is necessary.
112. In the contract-modification context, see Varouj A. Aivazian et al., The Law of Contract
Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
173, 186–92 (1984).
113. See, e.g., A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Grp.,
Inc., 873 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1989) (“For instance, a party might breach its obligation to bargain
in good faith by unreasonably insisting on a condition outside the scope of the parties’ preliminary
agreement, especially where such insistence is a thinly disguised pretext for scotching the deal
because of an unfavorable change in market conditions.”). See supra notes 34–49 and
accompanying text.
114. 96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
115. Id. at 279–80.
116. In cases in which a party demands the inclusion of a term omitted in the preliminary
agreement, a more complicated determination is whether the omission of such term is “closed” in
that sense. See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498–
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (declaring that parties may only negotiate open terms whose existence as such
is recognized).
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Association of America (TIAA), and they provide good examples of the risk
allocation function of preliminary agreements. The commitment letters in
those cases memorialized agreement on the basic loan terms, including the
rate of interest, but left other clauses to be negotiated in the next stage, such
as closing conditions, covenants, events of default, remedies, and default
prepayment fees.117 The letters stated that these other provisions would be
negotiated “within the scope that has been settled in the preliminary
agreement.”118 The court found that the letters were Type II agreements
because the parties did not intend to enter into fully binding loan agreements
but sought to police negotiations by agreeing to bargain in good faith.119
During the negotiation of the open provisions, market interest rates fell and
the courts found that the borrower in each case sought to escape or renegotiate
the rate of interest.120
In one case, the court found that the borrower objected to the lender’s
proposal to include a default prepayment fee as “a pretext for not going
forward with the loan,” instead of counteroffering or otherwise negotiating
over that term.121 The court held that the “refusal to negotiate with respect to
the Default Prepayment Fee Language was simply a last-ditch attempt to
scuttle the loan agreement . . . .”122 In a second case, the borrower insisted
that the deal was conditional on its ability to report the loan in its financial
statements as an off-balance-sheet item.123 The court found that the borrower
unreasonably insisted on a “condition that was outside the scope of the
bargain.”124 In the third case, the borrower argued that the lender had
inappropriately insisted on a call-protection right outside the scope of the
117. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Ormesa Geothermal, 791 F. Supp. 401, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that despite many open terms, all of the “crucial economic terms” were
set forth in the parties’ commitment letter); Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 496 (noting the plaintiff’s
contention that the open terms of “minor economic significance” included in the parties’
commitment letter by general reference, such as representations and warranties, closing conditions,
and other covenants, did not render it nonbinding); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Butler,
626 F. Supp. 1229, 1234–36 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that pursuant to their duty to negotiate in good
faith, the parties are expected to negotiate the terms of open provisions, such as acceleration clauses,
default prepayment fees, and lender’s remedies).
118. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498.
119. Id. at 498–99 (concluding that the commitment letter represented a binding preliminary
agreement, obligating the parties to pursue a final loan agreement by negotiating in good faith to
resolve open terms). In Farnsworth’s typology, these commitment letters would likely be
preliminary agreements with open terms, which would obligate the parties with respect to the settled
(or closed) terms while requiring them to negotiate the open terms in good faith. See supra note 36.
120. Ormesa Geothermal, 791 F. Supp. at 402–03; Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 496; Butler,
626 F. Supp. at 1236.
121. Butler, 626 F. Supp. at 1234.
122. Id. at 1235.
123. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 506. In the case, Tribune, the borrower, sold one of its real
estate holdings in Chicago on an installment basis and wanted to offset that income with the
borrowing from TIAA. Id. at 492. This was apparently for the purposes of making its balance sheet
look healthy for its upcoming initial public offering. Id. at 492–93.
124. Id.
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commitment letter, but the court held that the borrower’s argument was a
pretext for escaping an unfavorable interest rate.125 The court observed that
the “borrower took a negotiating stance allegedly designed to alter or scuttle
the transaction, and finally refused to continue negotiating with TIAA,
claiming that TIAA had ‘walked’ from the deal.”126
Significantly, the New York court in two of these cases awarded TIAA
with expectation damages equal to the difference between the expected
interest income under the contract and what it would get by lending to a third
party at the time of breach.127 Although the court expressed concern about
the lender’s specific investment,128 which might have been compensated with
reliance damages, its approach in the face of market change was to enforce
the allocation of interest rate risk that the parties had agreed to in their
commitment letters. Therefore, it held that expectation damages were
appropriate despite the fact that many provisions were left to be negotiated.129
b. SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc.—In other cases, whether and
how the parties intended to allocate risk of changes in their environment is
not as clear as in the loan commitment context of the cases described above.
Without such a clear indication, the court can look for evidence of such
allocation in the text or circumstances of the parties’ agreement, or it could
make an educated inference as to the parties’ likely intent. Whether explicit
or implicit, risk allocation in commercial transactions is typically meant to
promote efficiency. The basic principle underlying analogous elements of
contract doctrine is that the superior risk bearer is likely to be the party who
can control the probability or magnitude of the contingency or who can better
insure against it.130 This principle provides useful guidance in some cases. As
noted earlier, preliminary agreements are often executed in the middle of
diligence activity. Presumably, the risk of error in prior diligence should
normally fall on the party conducting the diligence (barring some act of
concealment or fault of the other party), while the risk of surprises from
future diligence would not. Indeed, preliminary agreements sometimes state

125. Ormesa Geothermal, 791 F. Supp. at 407–08.
126. Id. at 402–03.
127. Id. at 415; Butler, 626 F. Supp. at 1236; see also Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. at 498
(underscoring that, “of course,” contract law’s aim is to “gratify, not to defeat,” expectations arising
from an intended agreement, regardless of the need for further negotiations).
128. Tribune Co., 607 F. Supp. at 499 (“Without such legal recognition, parties would be
obliged to expend enormous sums negotiating every detail of final contract documentation before
knowing whether they have an agreement, and if so, on what terms.”).
129. It is true, however, that expectation damages in these cases mimic a reliance measure that
accounts for TIAA’s foregone opportunity to lend the money elsewhere at the time it made the
commitment. See supra note 53.
130. A classic example is the doctrine of commercial impracticability as explained in Richard
A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90–91 (1977).
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that final agreement is contingent on the report of a pertinent expert, whether
engineer, accountant, architect, or lawyer.131
The parties’ intent to allocate risks through settled terms in preliminary
agreements is not always as clear as in the case of loan commitments. The
Delaware case of SIGA Technologies, Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc. provides a
good example that highlights the importance of objectives other than the
protection of specific investments, particularly the allocation of risk. In that
case, there were no significant reliance expenditures after the term sheet and
the court opined that expectation damages were appropriate if the trial court
found that the parties would have concluded a contract but for the defendant’s
bad faith.132 Yet, the implicit allocation that would be thereby enforced is
debatable under the facts provided in the court’s opinion.
SIGA acquired an antiviral smallpox drug in 2004, but it encountered
difficulties developing the drug and was running out of money by the end of
2005.133 Desperate for an infusion of cash, it entered into discussions with
PharmAthene, who was interested in either acquiring SIGA or receiving a
worldwide license of the smallpox drug.134 While negotiating a merger, the
parties signed a two-page license agreement term sheet (LATS) in early 2006
that contained all the deal terms.135 They subsequently entered into a merger
agreement and a contract for $3 million in bridge financing.136 Under both of
these agreements, the parties agreed that if the merger failed to close, they
would negotiate a license agreement in good faith “in accordance with” the
term sheet.137 In fact, the merger did not close and the parties resumed
negotiating the license agreement.138 However, SIGA had meanwhile met
with considerable and unexpected success with the drug: it was awarded
approximately $20 million in new grants from the National Institutes of
Health and announced that the drug had provided full protection against
smallpox in a trial with primate subjects.139 It had also sold 2 million shares
of stock at a price more than three times its 2005 share price.140 Armed with
good fortune, SIGA then presented PharmAthene with an offer for a license
agreement on terms that were radically more favorable to SIGA than the term

131. See, e.g., Larwin-S. Cal., Inc. v. JGB Inv. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 52, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(noting that the buyer’s approval of its engineering report was a closing condition).
132. SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 350–51 (Del. 2013).
133. Id. at 334.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 335.
136. Id. at 337.
137. Id. at 337–38.
138. Id. at 339.
139. Id. at 338–39.
140. Id. at 339.
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sheet.141 When they were unable to bridge the gap, PharmAthene terminated
the negotiation and brought action in the Delaware Court of Chancery.142
At trial, the Chancery court held that SIGA acted in bad faith when it
proposed these radically different terms and breached its duty to negotiate in
good faith.143 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found that:
Evidence that “SIGA began experiencing ‘seller’s remorse’ during the
merger negotiations for having given up control of what was looking
more and more like a multi-billion dollar drug” bolsters the Vice
Chancellor’s finding that SIGA failed to negotiate in good faith for a
definitive license agreement in accordance with the terms of the
LATS.144
By pointing to the “seller’s remorse” in having given up huge profits from
the multibillion-dollar drug, the court implicitly interpreted the term sheet as
having allocated most of the upside to PharmAthene. SIGA could not use the
negotiation over the definitive license agreement to recover those profits by
modifying the terms any more than the borrowers in the TIAA cases could
use their post-commitment-letter negotiations to benefit from declining
market interest rates. Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court in SIGA
sought to protect PharmAthene’s inchoate expectation in the term sheet and
not simply its reliance interest. This recognition of an expectation interest
parallels that of the New York court in the TIAA cases. The Delaware
Supreme Court went on to state that:
[W]here the parties have a Type II preliminary agreement to negotiate
in good faith, and the trial judge makes a factual finding, supported by
the record, that the parties would have reached an agreement but for
the defendant’s bad faith negotiations, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover contract expectation damages.145
The implication of the court’s opinion is that a party such as SIGA could not
use supervening events that would improve its bargaining position to extract
better terms from PharmAthene.
Cases such as this illuminate the purpose of good faith bargaining
promises that go beyond the protection of reliance investments. The good
faith promise protects the distribution of contracting surplus from both valueclaiming behavior and the realization of allocated risks while encouraging
the parties to focus on maximizing the size of the surplus by designing
optimal contract terms. The court’s decision also protects this distribution
from the materialization of certain risks. In SIGA, PharmAthene’s argument
implicitly stated that the term sheet also conferred on it a significant share of
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 339–40.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 340–41.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 350–51.
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the upside risk of the drug’s effectiveness, although it would have been under
a duty to negotiate to an agreement if the drug’s prospects had dimmed.
Whether this risk had in fact been allocated through the provisions in the term
sheet could be disputed. The parties might well have contemplated a
renegotiation of the surplus distribution if the prospects improved as
dramatically as they in fact did. Given that the improvement was due to
SIGA’s post-term-sheet efforts, it is plausible that the parties would have
wanted to provide SIGA with a larger share of the incremental value.
D.

Remedies
In legal scholarship and in past judicial decisions, reliance is the
common measure of damages for breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith
in a preliminary agreement.146 This has been justified by two sets of reasons:
(1) the general contract law limitations on expectation damages and (2) the
sometimes narrow focus in the good faith duty to negotiate on protecting
relationship-specific or reliance investments. With respect to the first,
contract law requires generally that the plaintiff prove that losses were caused
by the breach. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for instance, provides
that “the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest
as measured by . . . the loss . . . caused by [the other party’s breach] plus . . .
any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach . . . .”147 Without proof of causation, the court may award no damages
or merely a nominal award.148 Contract law also requires that the plaintiff
provide evidence establishing the measure of damages with reasonable
certainty. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that “[d]amages
are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to
be established with reasonable certainty.”149 Significantly, where lost profits
are uncertain, the law provides that the reliance (or perhaps restitution)
measure may be appropriate, unless the defendant can prove that the plaintiff
would have incurred a loss rather than a profit from performance.150 Just like

146. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis added).
148. The causation requirement in contract law is sometimes considered to follow that in tort
law (including both but-for and proximate causation) and is also subject to mitigation and
foreseeability limitations. See, e.g., Wright v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., 59 F. Supp.
2d 794, 799 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (“Causation-in-fact is generally a prerequisite to recovery in both
contract . . . and tort . . . .”). But see 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, at § 12.01 (“[C]ausation in
contract does not necessarily correlate with causation in tort . . . .”). Proving causation in contract
law is typically not a serious hurdle for the plaintiff (consider, for instance, a seller who breaches
by not delivering a promised product or by delivering a defective one). It is a more significant issue
when the promise is a standard, such as good faith or best efforts (suppose the seller promises to
exercise its best efforts to deliver a conforming product).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
150. Id. § 349 cmt. a.
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any other contractual obligations, these contract doctrines apply to the choice
of remedy for breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.
Where the plaintiff seeks a remedy for breach of the good faith duty to
negotiate, these requirements lead courts to award expectation damages only
if the plaintiff proves that a contract would have resulted had the defendant
acted in good faith (causation) and provides sufficient evidence of the likely
terms of the hypothetical contract to provide a basis for calculating the
plaintiff’s lost expectation (reasonable certainty).151 The requirements of
causation and reasonable certainty present added obstacles to the plaintiff
suing for breach of a promise to negotiate in good faith compared to a
concluded deal such as an asset sale. With respect to causation, for instance,
if the defendant can show that the breakdown of negotiation was caused not
by its bad faith actions but by other intervening events, such as changes in
circumstances that made the transaction no longer in the parties’ interests, the
plaintiff will not be able to recover expectation damages.152
In addition to the requirement of causation, if the plaintiff cannot show
the damages with reasonable certainty, the court falls back on reliance,
restitution, or even nominal damages, depending on whether the plaintiff can
satisfy the reasonable certainty requirement. In Brown v. Cara, for example,
very few substantive terms were settled in the Memorandum of
Understanding, in which the parties expressly agreed to “work together” to
execute a contract for the development of a real estate joint venture.153

151. According to the court in Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 96 F.3d
275 (7th Cir. 1996), damages for breach of an agreement to negotiate in good faith
[m]ay be, although they are unlikely to be, the same as the damages for breach of the
final contract that the parties would have signed had it not been for the defendant’s bad
faith. If, quite apart from any bad faith, the negotiations would have broken down, the
party led on by the other’s bad faith to persist in futile negotiations can recover only
his reliance damages—the expenses he incurred by being misled, in violation of the
parties’ agreement to negotiate in good faith, into continuing to negotiate futilely. But
if the plaintiff can prove that had it not been for the defendant’s bad faith the parties
would have made a final contract, then the loss of the benefit of the contract is a
consequence of the defendant’s bad faith, and provided that it is a foreseeable
consequence, the defendant is liable for that loss—liable, that is, for the plaintiff’s
consequential damages.
Id. at 278.
152. The case of Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 159 A.3d 264 (Del. 2017), is
exemplary. In that case, Energy Transfer Equity (ETE) had an obligation to put in “reasonable best
efforts” in obtaining a tax opinion before the parties could close the acquisition transaction. Id. at
268. When ETE did not obtain the required opinion and the transaction fell apart, Williams sued for
breach of contract. Id. at 269–70. Although the court ruled that ETE likely breached its “reasonable
best efforts” obligation, the failure did not “materially contribute” (i.e., did not cause) to the failure
of the closing condition. Id. at 267–68.
153. Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2005). Based on the “work together” language,
the court stated that:
We cannot imagine more clear evidence of an intention to be bound to the MOU
[Memorandum of Understanding] as a general framework in which the parties will
proceed in good faith toward the goal of developing [the real estate joint venture] while
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Although the plaintiff was able to show causation—that the defendant’s bad
faith behavior prevented them from reaching an agreement—it was not able
to establish what the deal terms would have been and its expectancy loss.154
Of course, a court might be able to use legal defaults or standard terms in the
industry. However, the court may apply instead the reasonable certainty
requirement and award reliance, rather than expectation, damages.155 By
contrast, if the parties intended to bind themselves to the transaction (Type I),
they are likely to have agreed to more of the terms (than under a preliminary
agreement) and would have more clearly signaled their preference for legal
or industry defaults. Under such a Type I agreement, the court is more likely
to find that expectation damages have been established with sufficient
certainty.
The second reason for the common use of the reliance measure is that
scholars and many courts have limited their conception of the purpose of the
good faith bargaining duty to the task of minimizing the underinvestment in
specific investments. The reliance measure follows from this purpose.156 In
this Article, we have criticized this narrow view of the good faith duty.
Indeed, we have noted that, if the court can measure the amount invested in
reasonable reliance (i.e., the amount of reasonable reliance is verifiable by
the court), the parties can protect specific investments simply by promising
to reimburse each other’s reasonable reliance if the negotiations break down.
We have described a broader range of purposes for the good faith duty to
preserving for later negotiation the specific details of necessary business, design,
construction, financing, and management terms.
Id. at 158.
154. Id. (stating that although the plaintiff was entitled to demand that the defendant negotiate
remaining terms in good faith, “considerable efforts” would be required to reach a definitive
agreement).
155. Id. at 155 (stating that “the MOU reaches almost none of the terms . . . that require
negotiation”). The parties settled after the case got remanded to the lower court following the circuit
court’s failure to indicate the appropriate damages remedy. VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, Brown v. Cara,
the Type II Preliminary Agreement, and the Option to Unbundle, in RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW
AND CONTRACT DESIGN 207, 210 (2015).
156. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 28, at 667, 702–04 (arguing that, by using the
enforcement of good faith to protect verifiable investments, the parties encourage exploration of
potentially profitable ventures). According to Farnsworth, the appropriate remedy should depend
on whether the parties have a binding preliminary agreement with open terms (Type 1) or a
preliminary agreement with a duty to negotiate in good faith (Type II). Farnsworth, supra note 3, at
286. While expectation damages would be appropriate in the first case, Farnsworth argues that
reliance damages would be more appropriate since there is “no larger agreement” between the
parties and there is no way of knowing what its terms would have been or whether the parties would
ever have arrived at an ultimate agreement. Id. at 263. Knapp also states that the greater uncertainty
with respect to damages that flow from the breach of a “contract to bargain” makes expectation
damages unlikely. Knapp, supra note 3, at 723. He also states, however, that “[i]n some cases . . .
the main terms of performance, including quantity, quality and price, may have been so agreed upon
by the time of breach that an expectation remedy can be computed with as much certainty as is
usually required.” Id.; see also Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 98, at 451 (noting that by
restricting recovery to sunk investments, courts can provide remedies even where terms are
“severely incomplete”).
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negotiate and explained how the expectation measure of damages (subject to
the usual common law requirements) better vindicates these purposes. If the
parties’ intent is to preserve the distribution of surplus or the allocation of
risk or to maintain flexibility to adapt to new information, then the
expectation measure may be more suitable than reliance. When risk
allocation and flexibility are the primary objectives, granting the injured
party reliance damages would likely be suboptimal.
At the stage of a preliminary agreement, the parties have typically
bargained part of the way toward a deal that should yield a surplus for the
parties. The parties expect that further negotiation will increase the size of
the surplus but not dissipate it. As we have explained, a danger exists that
one party may seek to increase its share of the surplus, even at the risk of
destroying the deal. In scuttling the deal, the misbehaving party only loses its
share of the expected surplus; the rest is a loss borne by its counterparty.
When such behavior is a breach of the good faith duty, expectation damages
force the breaching party (party acting in bad faith) to internalize the negative
externality (loss of counterparty’s contractual surplus). Expectation damages
thereby deter destructive value-claiming behavior. The idea is similar to the
concept of negligence or gross negligence in tort law.157 If a tortfeasor’s
negligence is shown to have caused an accident that inflicts harm on a victim,
then the victim is entitled to be compensated for the entire loss caused by the
negligence. Similarly, in a contract setting, when one party acts in bad faith
and the bad faith actions deny the counterparty the contractual surplus, the
party acting in bad faith should be responsible for the injured party’s lost
contractual surplus, provided that the injured party establishes causation and
proves the loss with reasonable certainty.158
The foregoing discussion suggests that expectation damages are
appropriate where preliminary agreements allocate risks and the causation
and reasonable certainty of expectation losses can be verified. These
conditions are likely to be satisfied when the parties wish to allocate risks of
market fluctuations while they complete their negotiations. The case of
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co. discussed
earlier is exemplary. The parties in that case decided to allocate a market risk
by entering into a loan commitment letter, which contained the interest rate,
157. One could argue that acting in “bad faith” is more akin to being either “grossly negligent”
or even “reckless,” because bad faith actions usually accompany bad or ill intentions. Under tort
law, when a tortfeasor’s “reckless” action causes harm, the victim may be able to recover punitive
damages. By contrast, under contract law, punitive damages are not allowed unless the breach also
constitutes a tort. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This
Article is not arguing that breach of duty to negotiate in good faith should constitute a tort. Hence,
we focus on compensatory, and not punitive, damages.
158. On the flip side, when the defendant shows that it acted in good faith, even if the
negotiations fell apart and the plaintiff did not get to realize any contractual surplus, the defendant
will not be liable. Similarly, under the negligence-based liability in tort law, when the defendant
shows that it was not negligent, the plaintiff will not recover for any harm it suffered.
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among other key terms, but left less economically significant terms to be
determined through future negotiations.159 Since the intent to allocate risk is
relatively clear and the exogenous change in interest rates is easy to verify,
the court would award expectation damages if it found that the borrower’s
bad faith behavior caused negotiations to break down.160 As we have
observed, risk allocation was less clear in SIGA but the court found that the
defendant acted in bad faith by insisting on radically revised terms and the
bad faith actions led to the negotiation failure. Although the risk that
materialized was not a market risk, the parties had agreed to a fairly detailed
term sheet. It was correspondingly easier for the plaintiff to establish both
that SIGA’s bad faith behavior prevented them from reaching an agreement
and what the plaintiff’s profit would have been if they had concluded a
contract.161
While expectation damages may be appropriate in many cases, reliance
damages might be favored by the contracting parties simply because they are
usually less than expectation damages and therefore moderate the degree to
which the parties will feel stuck to the terms of their preliminary agreements.
If so desired, the parties can make appropriate adjustments in their
agreements. In this sense, the content of the duty itself and the remedy are
two levers that the parties can pull in tailoring their contracting and
negotiating strategy: they can adjust the stickiness of their preliminary terms
by adjusting the duty, the remedy, or both. In this sense, the parties have
considerable choice within the intermediate Type-II range existing between
a nonbinding agreement to agree and an agreement to execute their
transaction (with defaults filling any gaps). They can choose not only among
substantive obligations such as the duty to negotiate in good faith but also
among various damages measures.
The duty to negotiate in good faith is similar to other standard-based
obligations.162 Commercially sophisticated parties often enter into contracts

159. See supra subsection II(C)(4)(a).
160. The other TIAA cases, cited supra note 117, are similar in this respect.
161. According to the court:
[W]here the parties have a Type II preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith,
and the trial judge makes a factual finding, supported by the record, that the parties
would have reached an agreement but for the defendant’s bad faith negotiations, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover contract expectation damages.
SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 350–51 (Del. 2013) (emphasis added).
162. For instance, under either a requirements or an output contract, the Uniform Commercial
Code imposes a good faith obligation on the party with discretion over the quantity. U.C.C. § 2-306
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). If the party, for instance, refuses to make or take
any delivery, the court will have to deal with similar issues of: (1) whether the refusal was in bad
faith (even though making or taking no delivery in good faith is allowed) and (2) what the
appropriate remedy is. Similar issues will arise in an exclusive agency setting (without a minimum
sale condition) where the agent has an obligation to put in best efforts in making sales. In another
context, a typical merger agreement, the covenants section is replete with standard-based
obligations. It may require the target corporation to exert reasonable best efforts (or other similar
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with vague, open-ended obligations in place of more specific alternatives.
For instance, many corporate-acquisition agreements include covenants
obligating a party to exert reasonable efforts or best efforts in securing the
regulatory approval necessary to close the transaction. That party’s promise
is to exert reasonable efforts rather than to actually secure the approval. In
the event of a breach of such efforts, the counterparty is entitled to recover
damages, possibly expectation damages, subject to the usual requirements of
causation (including foreseeability and mitigation) and reasonable
certainty.163 In some transactions, the parties calibrate damages by agreeing
to pay break-up or reverse break-up fees if they fail to receive the specified
regulatory approval.164 By doing so, they eliminate the hurdles of having to
prove causation and damages with reasonable certainty. We address such
calibration of damages in the next Part.
III. The Use of Legal Standards to Vindicate the Goals of Staged
Contracting
While lawyers warn their clients against agreeing inadvertently to
legally binding terms in the preliminary agreements, it is clear that parties
often do contemplate some form of commitment.165 Commentators observe
that even when preliminary agreements are not binding, parties tend not to
depart materially from terms settled in those agreements in their subsequent
effort standard) in securing shareholder approval, disclosing material information to the acquirer,
obtaining regulatory approval, filing the necessary forms with the SEC, and otherwise dealing with
the buyer to consummate the transaction. Similarly, the section will typically obligate the buyer to
exert reasonable best efforts in obtaining regulatory approval, obtaining necessary financing, and
getting certain securities filings (such as registration statement S-4) approved by the SEC. See, e.g.,
Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *91 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1,
2018) (noting that the standard for reasonable best efforts requires a party to take all reasonable
steps to consummate the transaction), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018) (unpublished table decision);
ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 165, 189–90 (demonstrating that merger
agreement covenants typically require both the seller and the buyer to use commercially reasonable
efforts in filing forms with the SEC, seeking regulatory approval, and dealing with each other).
163. See Williams Cos. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 159 A.3d 264, 273 (Del. 2017)
(discussing the parties’ obligation to put in reasonable efforts to obtain a Section 721 tax opinion);
see also Verified Complaint at 6–7, Anthem, Inc. v. Cigna Corp., No. 2017-0114-JTL (Del. Ch.
filed Feb. 17, 2017) (accusing Cigna of breaching the covenant to exert “reasonable best efforts” in
securing antitrust approval and “sabotaging” the merger); Verified Complaint at 44–45, Cigna Corp.
v. Anthem, Inc., No. 2017-0109-JTL (Del. Ch. filed Feb. 17, 2017) (accusing Anthem of failing to
take “reasonable best efforts” to satisfy closing conditions as required by the merger agreement).
164. If the break-up fees are not stipulated (or determined by the court) to be the “sole and
exclusive” remedy, the plaintiff can seek expectation damages or even specific performance for the
other’s breach of covenant. ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 289.
165. See, e.g., Glob. Asset Capital LLC v. Rubicon US REIT, Inc., No. 5071-VCL, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 16, 2009) (order granting temporary restraining order) (explaining that parties enter into
preliminary
agreements
to
create
legal
rights);
ABA,
MODEL
MERGER
AGREEMENT, supra note 23, at 22 (stating that the target may require the buyer to deposit shares of
the buyer’s common stock and cash prior to the merger); NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL
ASS’N, supra note 22, at 1 (providing in the term sheet a limited set of alternatives for distributing
dividends).
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negotiations.166 How the stickiness is achieved is a matter of some
speculation, but it is often phrased in nonlegal terms. Frequently,
commentary suggests that parties use them to bind counterparties “morally,”
“psychologically,” or “ethically.”167 Of course, some business entities hope
to use preliminary agreements to bind their counterparty while retaining
freedom for themselves to withdraw with impunity.168 It is also possible that
the reputation of lawyers (and other agents, including financial advisers)
provides the discipline discouraging the parties from walking or demanding
unwarranted changes in settled terms.
In this Article, we have analyzed partially binding preliminary
agreements—which impose a duty to negotiate in good faith or with best
efforts—as formal instruments that govern the parties’ negotiation process
and have identified objectives beyond the protection of relationship-specific
investments. They create value by establishing parameters for negotiation to
promote the objectives discussed in the previous Part: (a) encouraging
efficient relationship-specific (reliance) investment; (b) preserving relative
bargaining power by deterring value-claiming or rent-extracting behavior;
(c) enforcing the risk allocation desired by the parties during the negotiations;
and (d) allowing flexibility to use new information and expertise to build
surplus from the deal.169 In many circumstances, the parties are unlikely to
wish for full enforcement of their preliminary agreements, under which the
court would fill the open terms with the legal defaults. This could impede
their incentive to invest and their flexibility to adopt improvements in their
deal terms. Such enforcement would not balance well the multiple goals that
often motivate the parties in the preliminary agreement; optimal enforcement
is thus something short of full contract enforcement. While there is a broad
166. See, e.g., Hwang, supra note 12, at 393 n.57 (“Dealmakers [that were interviewed] with a
wide breadth of experience—at firms and in-house, working with repeat players and one-off deal
parties, in private and public deals, in a variety of firms and cities, representing financial parties and
strategic parties—report that preliminary agreements have exceptional binding power.”).
167. See 2 COMM. ON NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 73, at 107 (“The parties may
also feel morally, if not legally, obligated to key terms [in a letter of intent] if those terms are set
down in writing.”); FREUND, supra note 62, at 60 (operating as “anti-renegotiation insurance,” a
letter of intent represents an “explicit moral obligation” between the parties); LENA G. GOLDBERG
& MARY BETH FINDLAY, HARVARD BUS. SCH., JUST AN MOU OR A REAL DEAL? 3 (2011) (“Unless
there has been a material adverse change, it may be difficult, psychologically, to renegotiate terms
that are expressly included in an MOU.”); Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 258 (noting that preliminary
agreements make it harder for parties to let negotiations fail, especially when the prospect of success
has been made public); Knapp, supra note 3, at 679 (arguing that business persons consider
themselves bound, if not legally, at least morally or ethically).
168. Mark K. Johnson, Enforceability of Precontractual Agreements in Illinois: The Need for a
Middle Ground, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 939, 939–40 (1993).
169. See Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 615 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[P]arties may wish to build in
safeguards . . . . This can be accomplished by binding themselves sufficiently such that they feel
comfortable investing resources into the deal, but without inextricably committing themselves to a
transaction that is still inchoate. Contracts to negotiate can satisfy this need.”); Ben-Shahar, supra
note 57, at 407 (“The precontractual commitment enables a party to commit to a specific partner
and a specific negotiation protocol without committing to specific terms.”).
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(although vague) consensus in favor of a middle ground, there are a range of
approaches suggested by legal scholars, many of which combine both legal
and nonlegal enforcement. In this Part, we review suggestions that scholars
and practitioners have advanced for the mechanism by which to reach this
intermediate level of enforcement. We then explain the obligation to
negotiate in good faith as a legal standard that promotes this objective.
At the other end of the spectrum from a fully binding preliminary
agreement, as mentioned above, Cathy Hwang observes that the terms of
preliminary agreements are sticky even though enforcement by courts is
likely to be nonexistent. She suggests that lawyers or financial advisors may
be the gatekeepers whose reputations are harmed when a party walks away
from such an agreement contrary to the parties’ expectations.170 As described
in the previous Part, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott advocate for protection
of specific investments through reliance damages, particularly in the specific
context they describe in which parties commit to making simultaneous
investments.171 Under their approach, the party who fails to make their
investment must reimburse the nonbreaching party’s investment (reliance)
costs. In a subsequent article, Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott
advocate for this scheme of reliance damages as “low-powered” legal
enforcement, which can combine with extralegal forces to implement the
desired degree of freedom with which the parties can deviate from the
substantive terms of the contemplated deal.172
Jonathan Barnett describes an interesting alternative configuration of
legal and extralegal discipline. He examines the context of Hollywood movie
deals and suggests that parties are disciplined by a combination of industry
norms and the possibility that a plaintiff would succeed in obtaining
enforcement from a court.173 He refers to these deals as “soft contracts” that
are possibly but not certainly subject to legal liability.174 Parties can achieve
their preferred level of enforcement and, conversely, transactional flexibility
by calibrating the level of formalization used to memorialize the terms, and
thereby controlling the probability that they will be legally binding.175 Barnett
describes that parties face “a calculated tradeoff—with respect to each deal
element, deal stage, and deal participant—that weighs the marginal
transactional flexibility [from the ability to walk away] and cost savings from
reduced formalization against the marginal increased risk of holdup and other
forms of counterparty opportunism.”176
170. Hwang, supra note 12, at 378–79, 405.
171. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
172. Gilson et al., supra note 28, at 1385–86.
173. Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64 DUKE L.J.
605, 607 (2015).
174. Id. at 607–08.
175. Id. at 608–09.
176. Id. at 644.
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Practitioners, courts, and scholars are all aware of the existence of
nonlegal sanctions that visit the party who unreasonably withdraws from
negotiations or makes outlandish demands. Sometimes, these extralegal
forces achieve the desirable combination of commitment and flexibility. For
example, in his discussion of soft contracts between Hollywood movie
studios and star actors, Jonathan Barnett reports that there are “norms”
deterring the most egregious forms of holdup that are available once a studio
has begun filming with a star.177 He observes that “[i]n practice, nothing close
to this extreme form of holdup behavior actually occurs: even in the absence
of a signed deal, talent attorneys report that they renegotiate open terms
following production but refrain from renegotiating the fixed
compensation.”178 This is consistent with the good faith negotiations that are
sometimes required in preliminary commercial agreements, which impede
the renegotiation of settled terms but provide flexibility in the negotiation of
open terms.
In other contexts, however, lawyers and scholars acknowledge that
nonlegal sanctions do not completely deter such behavior and might need to
be paired with some degree of legal enforcement. Scott Baker and Albert
Choi observe that many extralegal sanctions impose costs on both the party
that makes the sanction and the one that receives it.179 To impose a
meaningful relational or reputational sanction by suspending or even
terminating a relationship, the enforcer often must forego a profitable
transaction or relationship with the transgressor. Furthermore, for
reputational sanctions to be effective, the enforcer must obtain fairly reliable
information as to whether the putative transgressor indeed behaved
opportunistically. In contrast, the outcome of legal enforcement is a payment
of expectation or reliance damages between the parties, with some
deadweight loss for litigation. The parties, ex ante, may prefer the latter
system, especially when reputational sanctions can be triggered by faulty
information. In addition, in many contexts, the legal system is a reasonably
effective producer of information about the conduct of the alleged bad actor,
with access to different and sometimes more superior information than what
could be obtained by the counterparty and third parties in the reputational

177. Id. at 640–41.
178. Id. at 641.
179. Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559,
562–63 (2015). The analysis shows that while reputational sanctions impose the deterrence benefit–
cost ratio of one, legal sanctions, by contrast, can allow the parties to achieve a better deterrence
benefit–cost ratio, especially given that the plaintiff would be willing to bring suit only when the
expected return from litigation is higher than the expected cost. Id. at 601–02; see also Scott Baker
& Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly Legal Sanctions Can Work Better than
Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45, 47 (2018) [hereinafter Baker & Choi, Reputation
and Litigation] (showing how legal sanctions generate an “inframarginal” deterrence benefit that
reputational sanctions lack as well as generalizing and expanding the analysis on the informational
role played by legal sanctions).
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community. The fact finding of the courts may inform the discretion of these
parties to impose nonlegal sanctions.180
In short, notwithstanding the presence of various extralegal
mechanisms, such as social or commercial norms or reputational sanctions,
the parties may desire some form of legal enforcement (possibly as a
supplement) when negotiating a complex transaction. Under one approach
discussed earlier, the parties would agree to a binding set of deal terms (with
appropriate default terms to fill gaps), but anticipate subsequent renegotiation
and modification. If they wish to promote flexibility in renegotiation, they
might limit damages to reliance and thereby make it less costly for either
party to walk away from the preliminary terms. Each party would be bound
by these preliminary terms but only to the extent of the counterparty’s
reliance. The use of the reliance measure here, however, is somewhat
arbitrarily chosen because it is less than expectation damages and is
otherwise unconnected to the parties’ objectives.
The alternative approach invokes a legal standard—such as good faith
or reasonable efforts—to police the negotiation process.181 We have
identified several goals that the parties may seek to promote in regulating
their negotiation process beyond the protection of reasonable reliance
investment. These require a highly contextual approach that befits a standard.
Moreover, they call for a stronger enforcement remedy than reliance
damages. While reliance damages could be sufficient to protect and
encourage beneficial relationship- or deal-specific investment,182 they will
often be insufficient to achieve desired risk allocation, to deter valueclaiming or rent-extracting behavior, or to implement the most efficient deal
terms.183 Perhaps in response to these concerns, many courts have recognized
that expectation damages are appropriate if the plaintiff can show that a
contract would have been concluded if the defendant acted in good faith and

180. Legal and reputational sanctions can, therefore, be complements and not substitutes. Baker
& Choi, Reputation and Litigation, supra note 179, at 47.
181. Omri Ben-Shahar focuses on incomplete agreements where the parties deliberately leave
terms to be agreed upon later. Ben-Shahar, supra note 57, at 390. Instead of having the court police
the specific investments of the parties, he advances a novel proposal that the party seeking
enforcement of a deliberately incomplete agreement would have an option to enforce the transaction
under the agreed-upon terms supplemented by terms that are the most favorable (within reason) to
the counterparty. Id. Ben-Shahar argues that this facilitates sequential negotiations and deters
unilateral retractions or threats to precontractual investments. Id. at 392.
182. At the same time, protecting each party’s investment through reliance damages, when not
appropriately limited, could lead to overreliance. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 98, at 434
(explaining that a strict liability regime for reliance damages would likely result in “excessive”
reliance investment). In contract law, this issue is partially dealt with by the requirement that
reliance must have been reasonable.
183. Reliance damages deal largely with precontractual or ex ante behavior and are not suited
to tackling ex post (renegotiation) inefficiency. Optimally calibrated reliance damages can achieve
ex ante efficiency, but the parties will still have to deal with the hurdles of achieving ex post
efficiency, which reliance damages can address only indirectly.
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within the likely terms of that contract.184 This approach follows from the
contract law’s general requirements of causation and reasonable certainty. As
noted at the end of Part II, expectation damages are often a superior
mechanism for enforcing risk allocation as well as discouraging investment
in bargaining power while encouraging efficient relationship-specific
investment.185
Good faith and best efforts are familiar standards in contract and
commercial law. However, lawyers and scholars are often critical of vague
standards that call for fact-specific determinations because they introduce the
costs of unpredictability, judicial error, and litigation cost.186 This hostility is
somewhat curious, especially given the frequency with which complex
commercial contracts utilize vague, open-ended standards and obligations,
such as the covenant to exert reasonable or best efforts (for instance, in
securing regulatory and shareholder approvals), the material adverse change
condition, the promise to operate the business in ordinary course of business,
etc.187 Noting that contracting parties regularly agree to standards of conduct
even when more precise rules are available, we have addressed these
concerns in other work.188 The key lies in the design of corresponding
contract provisions that calibrate the relative levels of litigation costs and
liquidated damages for breach, in such a manner as to efficiently set both
litigation and performance incentives.
184. See supra notes 151–55 and accompanying text. Given that the optimal damages may
sometimes be less than expectation damages, expectation damages can serve as a penalty default
rule, providing incentive for the parties to contract around the default of expectation damages, for
instance, through liquidated damages.
185. As discussed in subpart II(D) on remedies, this is consistent with how certain courts (such
as in Tribune Co. and SIGA) have been willing to grant expectation damages, conditional on proving
causation (subject to foreseeability and mitigation principles) and reasonable certainty. Of course,
if the court believes that encouraging beneficial reliance is a more important goal, then the court
can award reliance, rather than expectation, damages.
186. Good faith is inherently ambiguous and calls for investigation into the parties’ intent,
thereby opening the door to costly consideration of evidence extrinsic to the contract document.
See, e.g., JamSports & Entm’t, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 824, 848 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (“The concept of good faith appears also to require an inquiry into the breaching party’s
intent.”). According to the Uniform Commercial Code, good faith means “honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.” U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Notwithstanding the cost and uncertainty of the necessary
factual determination, complex commercial contracts are replete with such standard-based
obligations. See, e.g., ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT 124, 189–90 (obligating the target
corporation to use “commercially reasonable efforts” in preserving intact the target’s business,
submit regulatory filings “as promptly as practicable,” and take “all actions necessary” in
consummating the merger).
187. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text for a discussion of such open-ended
obligations in corporate-acquisition contracts.
188. Of course, the costs of litigation and unbiased judicial error are avoided when parties settle
their dispute, as they often do. Even in cases where more precise and predictable arrangements
would have been possible, we have suggested that commercially sophisticated parties would still
opt for a vague standard. Choi & Triantis, Costly Verification, supra note 9, at 504, 519–20; Choi
& Triantis, Strategic Vagueness, supra note 9, at 854–55.
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To illustrate, suppose that a court will accurately determine whether a
promisor has breached the duty to negotiate in good faith, as intended by the
parties, two-thirds (2/3) of the time. That is, one-third (1/3) of truly breaching
promisors escape liability while 1/3 of truly nonbreaching promisors are held
liable.189 Suppose also that the parties know whether there has been a breach,
that damages are stipulated at an amount, d, and that the litigation cost for the
plaintiff is l > 0.190 By suing, a plaintiff invests l for a “lottery ticket” that
gives it a 2/3 chance of winning d if the promisor has really acted in bad faith
and a 1/3 chance of winning d if the promisor has acted in good faith. If d is
set such that 3l > d > (3/2)l, then the plaintiff will sue only when the promisor
has in fact breached.191 This is a fairly broad range, and the parties can
manipulate liquidated damages d and litigation costs l (for instance, by
contracting over choice of forum, arbitration, or procedural rules) to some
degree.192 When this condition is satisfied, the sanction of d provides an
accurate deterrent to breach of the good faith or best efforts standard, as it
was intended by the parties, even in the face of a substantial risk of judicial
error (1/3 of the time the court errs). Thus, where the parties adopt a
negotiation standard of good faith or best efforts, the parties can realize the
benefits of their contextual application while avoiding the downsides.193
The foregoing example suggests that even if the courts are error-prone,
the litigation process as a whole may be designed to yield efficient
enforcement and incentives. Furthermore, as we have argued in our earlier

189. The probability of 1/3 captures both false positives (type I error) and false negatives
(type II error).
190. While the conventional treatment of verifiability is binary (a factor is either verifiable or it
is not), our analysis assumes that the verification is costly, but not impossible, and that the cost of
verification includes: (1) possibly erroneous determination and (2) litigation cost. Although
liquidated-damages provisions are uncommon in intermediate agreements with the duty to negotiate
in good faith, the parties sometimes stipulate expense reimbursement or other similar remedy
provisions. Contracting parties often back standard-based obligations, such as an obligation to exert
reasonable best efforts in securing regulatory approval, with liquidated damages in other types of
agreements. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
191. In case the promisor has breached, promisee’s expected return from litigation is (2/3)d − l;
whereas if the promisor has not breached, the expected litigation return is (1/3)d − l. When (2/3)d
> l > (1/3)d, the first expression is positive while the second expression is negative. That is, the
promisee will bring suit only when the promisee knows that the promisor has breached. Note also
that when desired screening is achieved, the cost of dispute resolution also plays an important
deterrence role. This is because the promisor who breaches will incur the cost of 𝑙 for certain, while
the promisor who does not will incur no dispute resolution cost.
192. In corporate acquisitions, for instance, when the parties agree to resolve their disputes over
valuation using arbitration overseen by independent accountants, the parties can tailor their
procedures and rules of evidence. See LJL 33rd Street Assocs., LLC v. Pitcairn Props. Inc., 725
F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that when parties agree to arbitrate “it is indisputably
correct that arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence”).
193. In this sense we are allied with Barnett, supra note 173, at 635, who similarly sees virtue
in probabilistic enforcement; but we endorse the use of substantive standards in the terms (good
faith, best efforts) rather than the uncertainty from incomplete formalization of the deal.
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works,194 in designing the remedy (d from the example or when the court is
to determine the appropriate remedy) and the process of adjudication (which
affects l), the objective of the remedy is not compensation of the victim per
se but creating the screening mechanism to produce more effective
deterrence.195
Conclusion
In this Article, we have presented a function for preliminary agreements,
where contracting is done in multiple stages, that improves the efficiency of
complex business transactions. Parties may use the preliminary agreement to
regulate their negotiations by including terms such as the duty to negotiate in
good faith or with best efforts. We envisage a scenario in which the parties
have conducted enough of their search and diligence activities to be confident
that they have found the right counterparties. At this point, they seek to deter
value-claiming and encourage value-creating investments where valuecreation includes the discovery of optimal deal terms. They also often seek
to efficiently allocate risks of future changes in their circumstances. The
terms provided in the preliminary agreements must have some moderate
degree of commitment in order to satisfy this set of goals. We suggest—
consistent with the substantial amount of case law—that contract standards
such as good faith and best efforts can provide a desirable level of stickiness.
We also show how such standards can better address the hazard of
information asymmetry, where one party has (or is perceived to have) an
informational advantage over the counterparty in recognizing the optimal
deal terms. Good faith and best efforts obligations can effectively deter the
party from abusing its informational advantage solely for the purpose of
extracting a bigger rent from the other. In contrast to the prior scholarship
and concerns expressed by practitioners, we have argued that enforcing such
duty with simple reliance damages would often be inadequate and, in
pursuing goals such as risk allocation, expectation damages would be proper,
subject to the usual requirements of causation and reasonable certainty.
Finally, we explain the refinement offered by liquidated damages in
addressing judicial uncertainty stemming from a vague standard such as good
faith and the possible overdeterrence of expectation damages.

194. E.g., Choi & Triantis, Costly Verification, supra note 9; Choi & Triantis, Strategic
Vagueness, supra note 9.
195. In an ideal world, where the court does not err and litigation is costless, full compensation
for the injured party also achieves efficient deterrence. Compensatory damages may no longer be
efficient when the court is likely to err and litigation is costly, and this is where the screening and
deterrence objectives play a more prominent role.

